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Friday, June 19, 2020

Junge on Leadership II – CAPT Crozier?

By Bill Doughty–

Crozier, then-CO of USS Blue Ridge at a candlelight service in 2018.
In early April we posted a review of Michael Junge's "Crimes of Command," a book that analyzes the U.S. Navy's history of responsibility, accountability, culpability, punishment and forgiveness. We followed up that review with an interview with the author, incorporating initial news of the firing of CAPT Brett Crozier, CO of USS Theodore Roosevelt.

Today (Friday night) the Navy announced the results of a follow-on investigation of how Crozier and other leaders acted to get TR sailors to safety. In Orwellian reasoning, the investigation concludes: “(Crozier) should have been focused on doing everything he could to slow transmission of COVID-19 by moving Sailors ashore.”

The firing of CAPT Crozier, subsequent mishandling by then-acting SECNAV Modly, heavy-handed commentary by POTUS, and today's announcement blaming Crozier presents a case study in leadership and decision-making. CAPT Crozier's case dovetails with some of Professor Junge's insights.

We return for another interview with CAPT Junge. What are his thoughts about Crozier and Modly, undue command influence by the commander in chief, civilian control of the military, and what it means to be a good leader.

I am including photos of CAPT Crozier – including some prior to his position as CO of USS Theodore Roosevelt when he was executive officer of USS Ronald Reagan and then-CO of USS Blue Ridge, flagship of U.S. 7th Fleet.



Crozier flies the Retention Excellence Award (REA) for  2017
BD: What does the CNO's conclusion about CAPT Crozier say, in context of "Crimes of Command" –– responsibility, accountability, culpability? What are your thoughts about the final outcome of the investigation?

MJ: Initial reporting on this was...awful.  CNN reported “in a major reversal” even though the Navy never officially made changes to the actions taken in early April. What is interesting is placing responsibility with Admiral Baker but (reportedly) leaving out the staffs and other shore commanders.

The very fact that there were rumors of CNO Gilday recommending Crozier’s reinstatement go a long way to recognizing that sometimes senior people err when removing a commander, and even if the removal wasn’t in error that sometimes things can change in the operating environment which allow senior commanders to reconsider decisions.

Other than that, I’m concerned that we once again saw a single office investigation conducted via phone and email instead of a board of inquiry conducted in theater. The Navy conducted multiple boards during World War II yet we haven’t seen one within the Navy in the last two decades. I’m working on an opinion piece that will flesh this commentary out some more.

BD: You've said 'ethics' implies "a level of autonomy that requires decision-making, while 'rules' do not." Was Crozier showing the essence of ethical leadership? From what we know, could he have done things differently?

MJ: I believe Captain Crozier showed ethical leadership. He made a moral judgement, he articulated why he made that judgement and sent that argument and conclusion up the chain of command.

Could he have done things differently? Of course, that is always an option. But, could he have done things differently and still gotten the desired and necessary result for his crew? I think that is unlikely. Looking at the responses to shipboard cases after Crozier’s letter he was prescient in his recommendations.


Crozier, then-CO of USS Blue Ridge, observes as the ship departs from dry dock, Jan. 21, 2018. (MC3 Patrick Semales)

BD: What were among Acting SECNAV Modly's mistakes and failures as a leader in handling the crisis?

MJ: Modly did exactly what he accused Crozier of – he was emotional, took the email’s leak as a personal betrayal, and allowed the complexity of his challenge with the COVID breakout on the ship to overwhelm his ability to act professionally, when acting professionally was what was needed most. He compounded this error with the incomprehensible flight to Guam and speech to the crew.

What a leader should have done was not take any of the actions by captain and crew as a personal affront. A leader should have stepped back, thought of what was right for the institution and separate that feeling from personal concerns or fears of appearance or senior judgement of a decision or action.

Capt. Brett E. Crozier, then-commanding officer of the U.S. 7th Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), shows then-Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer and his wife, Polly Spencer, the bridge during a tour of the ship, July 12, 2018. Spencer met with leadership and spoke with the crew. Blue Ridge and her crew have now entered a final upkeep and training phase in preparation to become fully mission capable for operations. (MC2 Jordan KirkJohnson)

BD: What does the Crozier/TR incident say about Navy culture? Is there a possibility that it will have a chilling effect on bold leadership?

MJ: I think it will definitely have a chilling effect on leadership in general, not just bold leadership. In and of itself, these actions wouldn’t be much. When combined with two oft-repeated statements in the wake of the 2017 collisions and subsequent reports the signal – intended or not – is clear “do your job and don’t ask or question.”

Capt. Brett Crozier, then-executive officer of the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), visits the ship’s barbershop and gets a haircut April 30, 2015 from Ship’s Serviceman Seaman Apprentice Hailey Carlisle. Reagan was underway conducting carrier qualifications. (MC3 Timothy Schumaker)


CO CAPT Crozier washes crew's dishes aboard TR for Thanksgiving.
BD: Does undue influence at the highest levels – including the CINC – hurt the Navy's culture? We've seen several instances such as the overturning of Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher's conviction and subsequent ousting of SECNAV Richard Spencer. What are your thoughts on how this affects Navy culture?

MJ: Undue influence is only a problem when the subordinate leader allows that influence to affect judgment or action. If the first thought is “what will my boss think” then there is a problem, but it’s not the senior’s problem. But, the senior created the problem and must act proactively to solve it, if the senior desires to. Sometimes senior influence is necessary to right a wrong – sometimes different people have different ideas of what right or wrong is.

There is a great article called “Lawful Command Influence” that speaks to the “appropriate actions commanders or staff members can take within the military justice process to ensure good order and discipline is maintained within the ranks.” And this is not a new issue for any military service or government – it just is.

As different people and generations and legal regimes change, as norms alter, we have to relearn what is proper, right, and correct within the law. But, in general the right and proper thing hasn’t changed much in the past century. The biggest changes in legal action are around race, gender, and sexuality – but what was right and wrong really isn’t different.

Capt. Brett Crozier, center, then-executive officer of USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), and retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Raymond Swalley, World War II veteran, shake hands in the ship’s hangar bay during a ship tour. Swalley served as a pilot aboard USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) during WWII. (MC3 McFarlane)

Meeting Commander United States Forces Korea, Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, 2018.
BD: How tenuous is civilian control of the military? Why is this important in a free democracy? How can it be made stronger?

MJ: Civilian control is imperative in a democracy or any free government and I do not think it is at all tenuous. The best way to make it stronger is to encourage open and vigorous discussion, even debate.

I’ve seen too many adherents to civ-mil relations dismiss another point of view because the individual making it is military and not academic, or academic and not military, or not-Huntington, or something other than actually addressing the core argument.

I think it is also important to keep the work of civ-mil relations limited to the linkage between the military and civilian government.  Many now conflate the concept of civ-mil to include civil society and it shouldn’t.

There should be a study of the military’s relationship to society (and vice versa) but it shouldn’t be civ-mil – that’s military to civilian government. Likewise, there should be study of society’s relationship towards government.

Harry Summers [author of "On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War" (1982)"] misunderstood much of Clausewitz, but his redefined trinity has some value and the relationships between and among military, government, and society need discussion.*

Capt. Brett E. Crozier, then-commanding officer of the U.S. 7th Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), welcomes members of the Japan Self-Defense Force Joint Staff College for a tour aboard the ship, Sept. 18, 2018. (MC2 Adam K. Thomas)

BD: Similarly, why is it critical to keep an independent and strong Navy – as bold leaders fought for 70 years ago in the Revolt of the Admirals?

MJ: If we want to “play the away game” and be proactive about it, then we need a Navy. A strong Navy. It’s too late to start building a Navy after the first shots are fired.

The founders understood this and is why the Constitution requires that Congress must “maintain a Navy” and “raise an Army” though there is a lot of latitude there.

Another important leader who understood this was Franklin D. Roosevelt. He began a Navy buildup in 1934 - with further authorizations in 1938 and 1940 with a planned military capability for 1943, and that’s the path the USA followed in the war. 

Capt. Christopher Bolt, left, then-CO of USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), shakes hands with Capt. Brett Crozier, Ronald Reagan's then-Executive Officer, in celebration of his final arrested landing as command officer of Ronald Reagan, Sept. 15, 2015. (MC3 Ryan McFarlane)


Then-USS Reagan XO CAPT Crozier participates in general quarters drill in 2015. (MC3 N. Burke)
BD: You have expressed controversial opinions, including in your analysis and studies at the Naval War College, about how the Navy can continue to improve. How are you able to show such courage, and why is it important to provide unvarnished truth?

MJ: I’m not sure it’s courage so much as stubbornness and a little brashness. I have always believed in three things – intellectual honesty (truth), personal choice, and seeing the world the way it could be. I rarely press for a world as it “should” be, because that violates personal choice. I don’t like fooling people into doing something because that’s not intellectually honest.

As a Navy and a profession we are either strong, confident, and honest enough to choose telling the truth – varnished or not – or we aren’t. (See Q5 for some linkage here)

If leaders aren't strong enough to speak “truth to power” then are they really leading? Or are they really just good and diligent followers? And, when someone asks an “uncomfortable question” or “speaks truth to power” leaders need to ask themselves – why is this question uncomfortable? Why is someone disagreeing with me? That’s the secret part of humility as a leader – being open to the idea that you don’t have all the answers, which means listening to and considering critics.

Capt. Brett Crozier, commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), addresses local news media at Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, Jan. 17, 2020. The Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group was on a scheduled deployment to the Indo-Pacific. (MCSN Kaylianna Genier)

BD: Overall, it seems the Navy has done a remarkable job responding to the COVID-19 crisis, from informing the fleet and families, deploying USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort, providing Navy Medicine personnel, and dealing with deployments. How important is coronavirus testing of Sailors and Navy civilians to keeping readiness at the highest level?

MJ: I really try and stay out of the COVID discussions – we learn so much every day that what is said tomorrow is likely either wrong or out of context by tomorrow or the next week.  What we must do is remain vigilant, remain flexible, and clearly recognize that the world has changed and seek to capitalize on that change rather than an attempt at returning to the status quo ante.

BD: Thank you for a list of books and authors in our first interview. Expanding on that, what books do you recommend specifically on virtue, especially for Navy readers? As you said, "seeking virtue is a lifelong quest." Would you also share your recommended maritime books and authors?

MJ: 

Virtue:

"After Virtue," Alisdair Macintyre
"The Character Gap," Christian Miller
"Practical Wisdom," Barry Schwartz

Maritime Books:

Tom Clancy's "Hunt For Red October, Red Storm Rising"
David Poyer’s Dan Lenson Series
PT Deutermann's “Scorpion in the Sea” 
Herman Wouk: “The Caine Mutiny,” “Winds of War” and “War and Remembrance”

--------------------------

Just the titles of Junge's recommendations – "After Virtue," "Practical Wisdom" and "The Character Gap" – resonate in this COVID era of fear, mistrust of science, and the erosion of rule of law, integrity and leadership norms.

A big thank you to CAPT Junge for sharing his time and insights with Navy Reads, an unofficial blog in support of reading, critical thinking and the Navy's Professional Reading Program. Also, thank you to the mass communication specialists who helped show CAPT Crozier at the bridge, deck plates and in key leadership positions. Crozier is a profile in courage.


U.S. 7th Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) CO, CAPT Brett E. Crozier, speaks with Medal of Honor recipient Maj. Gen. (ret.) James E. Livingston during a Morale Welfare and Recreation tour aboard the ship, Aug. 17, 2018, in Yokosuka, Japan. Livingston was awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions during battle in the Vietnam War and spent time aboard Blue Ridge after the emergency evacuation of Saigon in 1975. (MC2 Adam K. Thomas)





* Harry G. Summers was interviewed at the Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, in 1996 and responded to point of view of the founders' intent of the military to be controlled by the people and their representatives, acknowledging that it was "implicit in their design for our government." Summers said, "Yes, and explicit as well in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which makes it very clear that the American military is a creature of the Congress, not of the executive branch. The Congress has absolute power over its very existence. Clausewitz laid it out in the early nineteenth century when he differentiated between eighteenth-century war – which was a matter for kings and presidents and princes, and the people were just observers – and nineteenth-century war as a matter of what he called "the remarkable trinity of the people, the government, and the army." That observation, a very profound observation that he drew out of the French Revolution, had been drawn almost fifty years earlier in the American Revolution and incorporated into our Constitution. We are a trinitarian military in the true sense of the word – which has enormous ramifications for the commitment of U.S. military power and for U.S. military policy."

Capt. Brett Crozier, left, commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), receives the national ensign from Personnel Specialist 1st Class Susan Figueroa, from Bronx, N.Y., during a burial at sea Jan. 20, 2020. The Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group was on a scheduled deployment in the Indo-Pacific. (MCSN Dylan Lavin)


Sunday, April 26, 2020

Navy Reads Interview: Author John M. Barry, 'The Great Influenza'

By Bill Doughty–

Historian John M. Barry
John M. Barry's "The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History," about the 1918 pandemic, has surged to become #1 on the New York Times bestseller list this past week. After its publication in 2004, Barry dedicated more than fifteen years as a self-proclaimed activist –– educating, advising and planning for a pandemic that could impact the United States.

On Feb. 6, 2020 Navy Reads posted a review of "The Great Influenza." I'm following up that post with this email interview with the prescient, farsighted author. He offers his views about truth-telling during a national crisis, the CAPT Crozier controversy, Navy's role in 1918 and now, and of course what's on his reading list.

BD: Your dedication of "The Great Influenza" was "To my Darling Anne and to the spirit that was Paul Lewis." Would you please remind us, why Paul Lewis? How should we all remember him?

JB: Lewis was an outstanding leading civilian scientist who became a Navy officer when the war started. He was a tragic figure. A scientist, brilliant, with an incredibly promising early career, he judged himself a failure partly because he could not develop a vaccine for influenza. Later, while seeking a vaccine for yellow fever he ended up infecting himself in a laboratory accident and dying of the disease. In fact I think there is a good chance it was a suicide. I just found his story moving and I wanted to honor him in some way. The book opens and closes with him.

HM1 Matthew Oberg advises people to get their pneumococcal vaccine at NH Bremerton, June 2015
BD: In what ways was the military, especially military researchers, important to the story of the 1918-1920 pandemic?

JB: Virtually every top scientist in the country became a military officer. The deans of medical school became colonels. The entire Rockefeller University (then called the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research) was incorporated into the army. Most of the science done in the pandemic was done by these people while in the military. All of them were trying to find an answer to the disease. They tried things we are trying now, such as using convalescent serum, and they did develop vaccines against secondary bacterial pneumonias. If you get an anti-pneumococcus vaccine today, it's a descendant of what was developed back then.

BD: What is your take on the way commanding officer Navy Capt. Brett Crozier dealt with the COVID-19 outbreak aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt?

JB: He did what leaders are supposed to do. Take care of people they are responsible for, as opposed to those above them.

CAPT Crozier, CO, USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). (Photo by Seaman Alexander Williams)
BD: You've said the most important lesson from 1918 is "tell the truth." Do you think Americans are getting the truth today?

JB: We are (getting the truth) from public health leaders and from many politicians, Republican and Democrat –– governors in Ohio, New York, Louisiana, off the top of my head. Unfortunately we are getting less than that from politicians in other places, including the White House.

United States Marine Corps COVID-19 poster. (LCPL Leslie Alcarez)
BD: Should there be more emphasis on various kinds of widespread testing in order to provide more data to epidemiologists, governors and others?

JB: Absolutely. Testing is everything. Think of a guerrilla war. You can't fight an enemy effectively unless you can identify that enemy. 

BD: (During the 1918 pandemic, once people confronted the truth and adapted to realities, some places like San Francisco came together as a community.) What are some good things that are coming out of the COVID-19 crisis?

JB: I think there has been a sense of community, that we are all in this together.  I think people are largely helping each other. I live in New Orleans and know some homeless people. A guy told me yesterday he almost cries because people have been so generous to him. My neighbor is a dentist and gave all his masks and gloves to a hospital, and he continues to treat emergency cases without an N95 mask. I'm over 70 and younger friends have volunteered to get groceries for me. A lot of little things like that add up.

BD: During this extended self-quarantine period of isolation, many people have more time to read. Who are some of your lifelong-favorite authors and books (of any genre)?

JB: Classic fiction mostly. Faulkner. Russian novels. I expected to do a lot of reading when I stopped going to my office, but right now I'm busier than any other time in my life. Communicating with scientists around the world, the media, trying to get people to comply with public health guidelines.

BD: What about books specifically for Navy readers; anything you'd recommend with a nautical, maritime or leadership theme?

JB: No nautical themes. Well, a river is in there. Always meant to read a Russian novel by a Nobel laureate, Mikhail Sholokhov, "And Quiet Flows the Don." That's the only book I've read lately and it's a great book. About Russia in World War I and the Russian Revolution. 

BD: Finally, are you considering a book perhaps on the COVID-19 pandemic? What are your book plans for the future?

JB: A week ago I'd have said no, but now I'm considering it.

###

Barry advised panels and groups under both the Bush and Obama administrations and helped develop stockpiles, plans and preparations for a pandemic. In every meeting he said he "pushed" the importance of starting out by telling the truth.

In addition to promoting truth-telling, Barry says that a federally guided and states-aligned response should prioritize providing protective equipment for frontline health care providers; testing, isolation and contact tracing; and sustained quarantine and stay-at-home measures while a vaccine is developed.

Barry is a Distinguished Scholar and adjunct faculty at Tulane University.

-------------------

Throughout 2020, Navy Reads intends to post other author interviews. Recently Navy Reads featured an interview with Michael Junge, author of "Crimes of Command." A review of Junge's book included a report about the firing of CAPT Brett Crozier, CO of USS Theodore Roosevelt. Since then, Acting SECNAV Modly was asked to resign after remarks he made aboard T.R.

Lt.Gen. Honore directs paratroopers in September 2005 during relief efforts along the Gulf Coast.
As this is posted, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday and Acting Navy Secretary James McPherson recommended reinstatement of Crozier as commanding officer of T.R. However, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Army Gen. Mark Milley, asked for a "broader inquiry." A decision on Crozier's fate is expected this week, according to news reports.

In a televised interview yesterday, retired Army Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honoré said, "It should be a simple decision for the Secretary of Defense." Honore was commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, coordinating military relief efforts for Hurricane Katrina in 2005 across the Gulf Coast. Like John Barry, he calls Louisiana Home. Honoré suggested DOD listen to its admirals. "This is the legacy of our great Navy. It should be an easy decision for Secretary Esper."

Wednesday, April 8, 2020

An Interview with 'Crimes of Command' Author

by Bill Doughty–

Naval War College professor CAPT Michael Junge is a forward-thinking former CO (of USS Whidbey Island), who has strong feelings about how the Navy can improve its culture and continue to develop good leaders without losing well-trained, capable and courageous commanders – leaders who aren't afraid to lean forward. As a follow up to the Navy Reads review of his "Crimes of Command," we present this interview with Professor Junge. It's about leadership, a post-COVID Navy, artificial intelligence, transparency, and critical thinking. We also asked him for some of his favorite reading and online recommendations. The interview was conducted online earlier this week.

BD: Would a culture of institutional forgiveness promote less risk-averse leadership/leaders?

MJ: This is a really difficult question AND one I had to spend some time thinking about.

First of all, the idea of a culture of institutional forgiveness is something we have to think about – what that looks like – and then the second thing is what it means to be risk-averse. Around 20 years ago there was a movement within the Department of Defense to eliminate accidents, a movement away from the previous idea of reducing accidents. Now, we should all know that you can't get rid of all accidents, there is always going to be some small percentage of things that go wrong. We can make them rare. We can reduce them to almost nothing. We cannot eliminate them. So I think that might be the first thing we would have to look at – what are we willing to forgive and what is unforgivable?

Then-CDR Junge helms USS Whidbey Island’s personnel launch during a 2008 port visit to Camden, ME.
The second thing culturally would be taking a look at how Naval Aviation handles their human factors boards and possibly moving that across more of the fleet. In Human Factors boards, and I hope I get this right, any pilot can be challenged on an action or can admit to an action and then have it discussed amongst the group of fellow pilots in the ready room. This includes the commanding officer. The surface Warfare Community does not have anything like that and I don't think the submarine community does either, so that would that would be a place to start.

Finally, we have to remember that every institution is made up of individuals and too often we conflate the two. Senior officers are not the Navy, and when they protect themselves, thinking they are protecting the Navy, they do a disservice to everyone. Forgiveness needs to be both individual and institutional and neither is an easy thing to grant. 

BD: Do you think some senior leaders, now more than in the past, use the Rickover-expressed view of responsibility/culpability to scapegoat the commanders below them? If so, how can that be stopped?

MJ: I'm not so sure if it's using a subordinate as a scapegoat or the fear that if someone junior isn’t sacrificed, then the superior commander is the one who's going to get fired. Either one is a really poor way to look at command.

Adm. Arleigh Burke, Nov. 23, 1960, at pep rally on eve of Navy-Army football game.
The area that I think could really really have impact on removals is just basic communications between immediate superiors in command and their subordinates. Both of the Navy-wide reports that looked at commanding officer detachments for cause indicated lack of communication and lack of discussion between commanders and their subordinate commanders. This is definitely something that is a more modern Navy problem than we saw in the past. 

There's an anecdote of Arleigh Burke as Chief of Naval Operations going from Norfolk to Key West aboard ship – all told, I think the trip was two weeks. I have no idea who the last Chief of Naval Operations was that spent the night afloat at sea. Now most ship visits are a couple of hours – a brief visit with commanding officer, a brief visit with the Chiefs Mess, then an all-hands call on the flight deck or in the hangar bay and move on. That's no way to maintain contact with what's going on in the deck plates. If that's also what’s happening between 06 and 05 commanders, that minimal level of contact and not getting to know the officers of a ship’s wardroom or the Chiefs; that's going to cause a level of unfamiliarity that then removes the benefit of the doubt for a ship.

I had command a decade ago, and of the four bosses I had, I only really felt close to one of them – and he got underway with us…repeatedly. Nelson's subordinates are referred to as a “Band of Brothers” and I really wonder whether or not we have that any longer amongst our commanders. 

BD: Considering the smaller number of personnel needed to operate newer ships and other platforms, would there be a commensurate need for Sailors who have achieved Kohlberg's third level of moral development: the postconventional level?

A Sailor removes deck material aboard USS George H.W. Bush in July 2019 (MCSA Bodie Estep)
MJ: I kind of reject the opening premise of this question. I served on five different hull types and saw smaller crews and larger crews and I don't agree that a smaller number of personnel are needed to operate newer ships. I do agree that we are moving towards a smaller number of people operating newer ships, but when we do that we start losing track of who is doing the basic maintenance. Who is doing the cleaning, the painting, the corrosion control? Those are things that still have to happen, and as you reduce the crew size you increase workload on individual sailors.

I'll also be brutally honest and say that the vast majority of sailors will never need to achieve the third level of moral development. The vast majority of sailors are OK operating in the rules following environment, doing what is right based on norms and rules. And that's part of why we have to have rules that can be followed ...

BD: Do you think artificial intelligence can assume the role of rote-operating Sailors as described in Herman Wouk's "The Caine Mutiny": "If you’re not an idiot, but find yourself in the Navy, you can only operate well by pretending to be one"? Will deployment of AI accelerate after this pandemic?

MJ: This quote is one that has come up a lot in the last 10 years among conversations I've been in but a lot of it has to do with the other part of that quote – “The Navy is a master plan designed by geniuses for execution by idiots." That made perfect sense, especially to a very junior officer serving in World War II. From that level, the entire organization of the Navy looked like it was smart and well put together. The more I study the Second World War, the more I think it was really a Navy of resilient individuals who made things work rather than unintentional creation.

I'm also skeptical of AI in general. One of the first problems is we can’t agree on a definition of what AI is – and if we can’t define it then we really can’t talk about it. You can't talk about whether you're going to use it or not if you don’t know what “it” is. But if artificial intelligence can do things to take some of the cognitive load off of sailors then it's possible we'll see more but I think we're a long way away from having ships that are unmanned or even optionally manned or even the level of, say, a modern cargo ship.

HTFN Allyson Shay welds aboard USS Whidbey Island, July 7, 2016. (MC2 Nathan McDonald)
Regardless of how good artificial intelligence becomes, unless the AI is capable of cleaning, corrosion control, or painting, someone's going to have to do those. I think we'd be far better served to spend time figuring out a better design for a watertight door or better and longer lasting paint or better design to prevent corrosion like ensuring that the deck drains are actually the lowest point of a deck and not the highest point than worry about finding artificial intelligence to help reduce the cognitive load for a combat scenario where we don't even have sufficient ordnance to launch against a notional enemy.

BD: Why should senior leaders welcome transparency, especially in peacetime, as long as it doesn't violate operational security?

MJ: The important part about transparency is that transparency is how seniors educate subordinates on how and why a decision is made. That way, when speed of execution is needed, the subordinate understands the rationale behind how the boss thinks and can execute both the stated and intended mission.

When a commander just says “go do it” and doesn't explain why or doesn't allow for questions to be asked then that's what the subordinate learns – tell people to execute a decision. Then you lose that resilience we need. So that's where transparency is important.

One of the things found in the Greeneville/Ehime Maru collision was junior watchstanders knowing something was wrong, but either trusting the captain, or afraid to question a captain known for his operational acumen. But, he was wrong, those people didn't speak up and that led to disastrous results.

Capt. Brett Crozier, commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), addresses the crew during an all hands call on the ship’s flight deck Dec. 15, 2019. Theodore Roosevelt was underway conducting routine training in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. (Photo by MCSN Kaylianna Genier)
BD: The current COVID-19 pandemic presents threats, disruptions and changes. What do you foresee changing in the Navy when we all get back on our feet after this?

MJ: I'm not sure I really see anything changing in the Navy when we all get back on our feet after this. Mostly because, as I say this, as I write this, the operational Navy has really tried to go about business as usual. But that's the operational side; the shore side should and could be taking some serious lessons here about telework and the opening up of more jobs to more telework.

There’s a chance for some tremendous solutions for efficiency, better work-life integration, and overall productivity if we just look for them. Lots of people in DC commute two to four hours each day; that’s just plain-old lost time and productivity that can be regained for all sorts of things.

Rear Adm. Shoshana S. Chatfield, president of U.S. Naval War College, attends Quartermaster 1st Class Jessie Jowers’s reenlistment ceremony via FaceTime at NWC, March 20, 2020. Jowers reenlisted for an additional four years. Friends and colleagues attended in support of his dedication to the U.S. Navy and practiced social distancing by remaining at least six feet apart due to the COVID-19 virus. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Tyler D. John)
BD: Re critical thinking: What books do you recommend to people to help them think about thinking?

MJ: I recommend first and foremost any of the Freakonomics books. Secondly, I recommend two books by Ashley Merryman and Po Bronson. The first is “Nurtureshock” and the second is “Top Dog.”

“Nurtureshock” is about child raising, which may seem an unconventional recommendation, but the basic fact is that half of our Sailors are below 26 years of age and many of them are just out of high school so understanding how they grew up and what impacted them is important.

“Top Dog” is a scientific look at success.

Both Bronson-Merryman books take a kind of a Freakonomics, unconventional wisdom approach to the subjects. After that, anything on behavioral economics. 

BD: Who are some of your favorite all-time, any genre authors and books?

Neil Gaiman (Wikipedia Commons, Kyle Cassidy.
MJ: I grew up largely reading fantasy and science fiction and have read and reread “The Hobbit,” “The Lord of the Rings,” “Starship Troopers,” and “Ender's Game.” Robert Heinlein is probably my single favorite author. Neil Gaiman is my favorite living author. 

BD: Any specific recent books on online resources you'd recommend for these stay-at-home days?

MJ: I start with a YouTube channel called the “School of Life” and another called “Crash Course.” I find videos are easier to help me make connections and all these episodes are fairly concise – so much more comprehensible than longer writings.  They don’t substitute for those longer writings, but they do complement them.

BD: Are you considering another book? What does the future hold for you?

Michael Junge, courtesy photo
MJ: That’s a really good question. I am working on a revised, expanded, and largely new version of “Crimes of Command” – likely even with a new title. So much happened in 2017, 2018, 2019, and now in 2020 that I think I can add some more insight into what's going on. I’m also want to write a book on the USS Belknap and USS John F. Kennedy collision. I have a concept for that in my head, so that's also in the works.

But, before all that happens I need to find a post-Navy retirement job and that is taking up a lot of my thinking time, so we'll see where things go.

###

A big thanks and Aloha to CAPT Junge for this interview, a follow-up to our post earlier this week on his insightful book "Crimes of Command," which includes Junge's biography.

(My previous Navy Reads blogpost also included a commentary about the firing of CAPT Brett Crozier, CO of USS Theodore Roosevelt. Since that post, Acting Secretary of the Navy Modly flew to Guam to address the crew on the 1MC, during which he called Crozier "stupid" and "naive" and complained repeatedly that Crozier had complained and used poor judgment for how he tried to get help for his crew during a COVID-19 outbreak. On April 7, however, Modly apologized and resigned, reportedly at the direction of his chain of command. In COVID-19 press conferences this week, Commander in Chief President Trump mocked CAPT Crozier, first on April 6 – "this isn't a literature class" – and again on April 7 (after claiming he "would not have asked for" Modly's resignation), saying Crozier "didn't have to be Ernest Hemingway." That comment reminded me that Hemingway was Senator John S. McCain's inspiration, especially when McCain, a naval aviator and hero, was a POW in Vietnam. In fact, we published a post Aug. 12, 2018 about McCain's Hemingway inspiration. A related recommended read is Yahoo News reporter Michael Walsh's Aug. 26, 2018 remembrance of McCain: "The bell tolls for John McCain: How Hemingway's antifascist hero shaped the man." – Bill Doughty)

McCain and Hemingway photo illustration from Yahoo News

Sunday, April 5, 2020

Crozier, Rickover & 'Crimes of Command'

Review by Bill Doughty–

Rickover in 1922
One hundred years ago, in the midst of the Great Influenza global pandemic, Midshipman Hyman G. Rickover was studying at the Naval Academy. He'd arrived in Annapolis in 1918, but before he could take classes he was quarantined with what was diagnosed as diphtheria. He had to bend the rules to study, but he succeeded, survived the Academy (and the pandemic), and graduated.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt III – TR's grandson – presented a diploma to Rickover (along with more than five hundred classmates) in 1922. 

Rickover changed the culture of the Navy toward higher standards in inspections, safety and training. He championed nuclear propulsion and became the father of the nuclear Navy.

He also helped change Navy's concept of responsibility, according to Michael Junge* in "Crimes of Command: In the United States Navy 1945-2015" (printed in the United States of America, 2018; ISBN 978-1721230068). Ironically, just as Rickover did, Junge stresses the importance of the meaning of words like "responsibility." Junge writes:
"Navy culture has lost the ability to properly separate and distinguish between culpability, accountability, and responsibility. Navy culture no longer fully understands ethics and ethical dilemmas. Navy culture now sees administration and bureaucratization as professionalism. These issues are interrelated, but all lead to one inescapable conclusion – Navy culture must change. Navy culture must rediscover the core of its language. It must understand the truth behind the myth and rhetoric of command if it is to continue into the future and remain relevant. Making these changes will come from those who have both experience and education, practice and theory – from those who can properly perceive a situation, have the appropriate feelings about it, can properly deliberate about what was appropriate in those circumstances, and to act."
Junge says, "When combined with lax language, the Navy is rife for a culture of 'ready, fire, aim' responses to crimes of command." He explores the "ethics of military virtue," referring to works from psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and others, including Richard D. White, Ruth Benedict, Peter E. Langford, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg and Samuel Huntington.

Quoting authors Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe, he writes, "An ethical dilemma arises when two or more competing values are important and in conflict.'" Although some leaders in the military place the highest value in obedience and blind loyalty to the chain of command, what is a commander to do when faced with "loyalty to a superior or to the crew"?

"Ethics is about 'figuring out the right way to do the right thing in a particular circumstance, with a particular person, at a particular time.'"

CAPT Crozier, 'GOAT'

Skipper Crozier aboard TR, March 3, 2020. (MCSN Kaylianna Genier).
Captain Brett Crozier, until several days ago the commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), faced a moral and ethical dilemma when a relatively small but growing number of his nearly 5,000 crew tested positive for the coronavirus, and he asked for help from his chain of command to save lives. [Just a reminder that Navy Reads is an unofficial blog, and unquoted comments here are my own.]

On March 30, Crozier wrote a three-and-a-half page letter – not five pages as claimed by his commander in chief, President Trump, who mocked the letter as a work of "literature" April 4 during a nationally televised press conference. “I thought it was terrible what he did, to write a letter. This isn’t a class on literature," Trump told reporters.

Crozier asked clearly for "decisive action" after days of attempting to get help in protecting his Sailors as the spread of the virus accelerated. His letter got immediate action but also resulted in the acting Secretary of the Navy firing him and removing him from his ship. Acting Navy Secretary Modly fired him for allegedly causing a "firestorm" when the request for help was published.

At Saturday's COVID-19 press conference, Trump questioned the wisdom of doing a visit to Vietnam March 5. "I guess the captain stopped in Vietnam and people got off in Vietnam,” Trump said. “Perhaps you don’t do that in the middle of a pandemic or something that looked like it was going to be. History would say you don’t necessarily stop and let your sailors get off.”

Modly and Trump at Naval Academy graduation, May 25, 2018. (CPL H. Clay)
At the same time that the TR was in Vietnam, back in the United States Trump participated in an extended phone interview on Fox News March 4, in which he said about coronavirus, "I started hearing about it very quietly a couple of months ago from China and I said, 'Wow, I hope that doesn't happen here.'"

He told host Sean Hannity: "I just say it's a very very small number in our country," and "A lot of things have happened that have been very fortunate. We are doing a good job."

Downplaying the severity of the virus, Trump said on March 4, "Now, and this is just my hunch, and – but based on a lot of conversations with a lot of people that do this. Because a lot people will have this and it's very mild. They'll get better very rapidly. They don't even see a doctor. They don't even call a doctor," Trump said. "You never hear about those people. So you can't put them down in the category of the overall population in terms of this corona flu and or virus. So you just can't do that," he continued. "So if, you know, we have thousands or hundreds of thousands of people that get better, just by, you know, sitting around and even going to work – some of them go to work but they get better."

Media in Vietnam meet dignitaries, including Ambassador Kritenbrink and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Adm. Aquilino, at the arrival of  USS Theodore Roosevelt’s (CVN 71) and the USS Bunker Hill’s (CG 52) arrival in Da Nang, Vietnam, March 5, 2020. (Photo by MC3 Brandon Richardson)
Meanwhile, in Vietnam at that same time, Sailors were encouraged by their chain of command to participate in cultural and professional exchanges, community service projects, sports competitions, and receptions during the port visit, including at the invitation of Trump-appointed U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Daniel Kritenbrink who met with senior Navy officers and various media during the visit.

Who is to "blame" for TR visiting Vietnam? Who is responsible for not responding immediately to CAPT Crozier's desperate pleas for help for his crew as his Sailors became sick? Was Crozier punished for speaking truth to power?

Capt. Brett Crozier, commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), sits inside the cockpit of an F/A-18E Super Hornet, assigned to the “Blue Diamonds” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 146, Nov. 13, 2019, aboard Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71).  (MC3 Nicholas Huynh)
Skipper Crozier's bio and web presence show a stellar, accomplished and gifted naval aviator and leader of leaders – a graduate of the Naval Academy, trained in nuclear power, with an advanced degree from the Naval War College. He served in Hawaii; in CONUS; in Naples, Italy with NATO; and in Iwakuni and Yokosuka, Japan. While aboard USS Nimitz he supported Operation Iraqi Freedom. And he served as the Executive Officer of USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) till July 2016. During that tour USS Reagan took part in RIMPAC 2014 and came to Yokosuka to relieve USS George Washington (CVN 73). Crozier then served as commanding officer aboard USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), flagship of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, before becoming TR's CO November 1, 2019.

His Sailors call him GOAT: Greatest Of All Time. They cheered him as he departed his ship.

In late-breaking news, it is reported today that Crozier himself has tested positive for the COVID virus.

What's the Real Crime

Junge (again, not intended to be referring to Crozier) wrote this about Navy's tendency to figuratively eat its own:
"The Navy must remember that commanders, competent commanders, are in short supply. The rarity of command in itself means that every commander has valuable, and rare, experience. By removing and discarding virtually all commanders who commit crimes of command the Navy wastes precious resources. Chester Nimitz's and William Raborn's contributions testify to the potential value lost when the Navy sent Kirk Lippold [USS Cole (DDG 67) CO], Glenn Brindel [USS Stark (FFG 31)], Walter Shafer [USS Belknap (CG 26) CO], and over a hundred other commanders home over the last three decades rather than afford them an opportunity at redemption."
He says the Navy now favors "retribution and removal" over "remorse and rehabilitation." And he asks, "Are officers who protect the Navy from airing dirty laundry loyal to the institution, or disloyal to the country?" 

As a reminder, the nation's first whistleblowers were Sailors.

In the U.S. Naval War College Review ("Leadership and Decision—From Accountability to Punishment," Naval War College Review: Spring 2020; Vol. 73: No. 2, Article 5) Junge graphs and compares the "number of officers forgiven or allowed rehabilitation." It's clear that CO removals are way up in recent years.



He writes, “In the modern Navy, a commander is most likely to be removed for personal misconduct or when the crime of command includes one or all of the following elements: death, press coverage, or significant damage to the Navy, whether materially or to its reputation.”

Junge notes, "Because commanders are now judged via an administrative process during which they enjoy fewer rights than they would in a judicial process, removal for personal misconduct is lumped in with operational incidents."

Junge's book was written well before the current pandemic, obviously. He mentions personal individual actions such as infidelity and alcohol incidents. But the book focuses primarily on "crimes" such as shipboard accidents and ship and submarine collisions, allisions and groundings. We read about accidents by Bainbridge and Barry from the Navy's early history and see how they were forgiven and fondly remembered. Mullen and Nimitz similarly rose from what could be called career-ending incidents during a more forgiving time.

Junge reminds us of the fate of USS Indianapolis (CA 35) and its captain, Charles B. McVay, III, who was pilloried for not zigzagging his ship in order to avoid enemy torpedoes. And we learn about USS Hobson (DMS 26), cut in half by USS Wasp (CV 18) in 1952, with 176 Sailors killed, including the captain. Junge provides examples of significant incidents, including among others, those involving USS McFaul (DDG 74) and USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) in 2008, USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110) in 2013, and separate collisions involving USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) in 2017.

Junge sees a change in naval culture in 1965-1985, a period where "individual responsibility was replaced with an idea of culpability for the CO, for simply being in command."

He notes that Rickover's shadow was long. Five of the previous eleven Chiefs of Naval Operations being officers who Rickover had interviewed and in some cases personally mentored.

Such was the case for CNOs Adm. James L. Holloway III and especially Adm. James D. Watkins, who, with Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, codified the "first open and official linkage of authority, responsibility, and accountability and their indivisible nature."

"Watkins also took Rickover's ideas outside the Navy," Junge writes. "After retiring as CNO, Watkins remained active in government, first as chairman of the Reagan commission on the HIV epidemic, then as Secretary of Energy for President George H.W. Bush." 

Watkins, echoing Rickover, once wrote, "The doctrine of accountability has always been a part of command and a very active part of that doctrine is that you cannot delegate responsibility and authority to another." The man at the top, according to that view, should be responsible, accountable and culpable.

Core Values, Including ...

Junge offers a nuanced perspective to ethical military virtue. He says "the Navy must return to a time when a commander can commit a crime of command, be judged and afforded an opportunity to seek and receive forgiveness; an opportunity for redemption." 

In fact, he suggests another core value for the Navy along with honor, courage and commitment: forgiveness. And he bases his suggestion in part on theology, citing Jesus Christ, and also in science, showing research in ethics and morality.

For example, Kohlberg identified three levels of moral development, each with two stages. "At the lowest level, individuals are self-centered and amoral, focused on not being caught and punished," Junge writes.

"Most military personnel fit within Level II, Stages 3 or 4. Rules are clear cut, group approval is desired, and authority is respected," Junge says. If a person has more fully evolved, he or she can achieve a level of enlightened moral development. "Stage 5 accepts legal authority, but also seeks to change unjust laws. Stage 5 is the core basis or ideals of American morality."

"While Rickover created Level II organizations, he did not operate at that level." Because he had been quarantined he was behind in his studies at Annapolis. "When he returned to class he was behind, and in order to catch up Rickover violated academy rules to study after taps." Far from being a two-dimensional caricature, Rickover was complicated; he even knew how to forgive others, as Junge shows.

Junge's book, available on Kindle at Amazon, is rich in history, psychology and critical thinking. Readers are asked to consider the true meanings of responsibility, accountability and culpability. Junge introduces readers to a rich resource of authors and books, and he reminds us of the words of Adm. Arleigh Burke: "A commander who fails to exceed his authority is not much use to his subordinates."

As this blog goes online, CAPT Crozier faces possible disciplinary action in an apparent expedited investigation. But his Sailors aboard TR are more protected and are now receiving COVID-19 tests.

(*Michael Junge is an active duty Navy Captain with degrees from the United States Naval Academy, United States Naval War College, the George Washington University, and Salve Regina University.  He served afloat in USS Moosbrugger (DD 980), USS Underwood (FFG 36), USS Wasp (LHD 1), USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) and was the 14th Commanding Officer of USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). Ashore he served with Navy Recruiting; Assault Craft Unit 4; as Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, Marine Corps; as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks (N6); and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is a military professor at the U.S. Naval War College.)


Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class Michael Lusk, from Baltimore, takes a swab sample for COVID-19 testing aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), April 1, 2020.  (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Dartañon D. De La Garza/Released)
Seabees assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 1 and NMCB 5 coordinate transportation of Sailors assigned to the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) who have tested negative for COVID-19 and are asymptomatic from Naval Base Guam to Government of Guam and military-approved commercial lodging. Sailors will be required to remain in quarantine in their assigned lodging for at least 14 days, in accordance with DoD directive and the Governor’s executive order. The vehicles departed the pier and picked up Theodore Roosevelt Sailors who had previously been isolated from the ship at locations on board Naval Base Guam. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Matthew R. White/Released)