Crozier, then-CO of USS Blue Ridge at a candlelight service in 2018. |
Today (Friday night) the Navy announced the results of a follow-on investigation of how Crozier and other leaders acted to get TR sailors to safety. In Orwellian reasoning, the investigation concludes: “(Crozier) should have been focused on doing everything he could to slow transmission of COVID-19 by moving Sailors ashore.”
The firing of CAPT Crozier, subsequent mishandling by then-acting SECNAV Modly, heavy-handed commentary by POTUS, and today's announcement blaming Crozier presents a case study in leadership and decision-making. CAPT Crozier's case dovetails with some of Professor Junge's insights.
We return for another interview with CAPT Junge. What are his thoughts about Crozier and Modly, undue command influence by the commander in chief, civilian control of the military, and what it means to be a good leader.
I am including photos of CAPT Crozier – including some prior to his position as CO of USS Theodore Roosevelt when he was executive officer of USS Ronald Reagan and then-CO of USS Blue Ridge, flagship of U.S. 7th Fleet.
Crozier flies the Retention Excellence Award (REA) for 2017 |
MJ: Initial reporting on this was...awful. CNN reported “in a major reversal” even though the Navy never officially made changes to the actions taken in early April. What is interesting is placing responsibility with Admiral Baker but (reportedly) leaving out the staffs and other shore commanders.
The very fact that there were rumors of CNO Gilday recommending Crozier’s reinstatement go a long way to recognizing that sometimes senior people err when removing a commander, and even if the removal wasn’t in error that sometimes things can change in the operating environment which allow senior commanders to reconsider decisions.
Other than that, I’m concerned that we once again saw a single office investigation conducted via phone and email instead of a board of inquiry conducted in theater. The Navy conducted multiple boards during World War II yet we haven’t seen one within the Navy in the last two decades. I’m working on an opinion piece that will flesh this commentary out some more.
BD: You've said 'ethics' implies "a level of autonomy that requires decision-making, while 'rules' do not." Was Crozier showing the essence of ethical leadership? From what we know, could he have done things differently?
MJ: I believe Captain Crozier showed ethical leadership. He made a moral judgement, he articulated why he made that judgement and sent that argument and conclusion up the chain of command.
Could he have done things differently? Of course, that is always an option. But, could he have done things differently and still gotten the desired and necessary result for his crew? I think that is unlikely. Looking at the responses to shipboard cases after Crozier’s letter he was prescient in his recommendations.
Crozier, then-CO of USS Blue Ridge, observes as the ship departs from dry dock, Jan. 21, 2018. (MC3 Patrick Semales) |
MJ: Modly did exactly what he accused Crozier of – he was emotional, took the email’s leak as a personal betrayal, and allowed the complexity of his challenge with the COVID breakout on the ship to overwhelm his ability to act professionally, when acting professionally was what was needed most. He compounded this error with the incomprehensible flight to Guam and speech to the crew.
What a leader should have done was not take any of the actions by captain and crew as a personal affront. A leader should have stepped back, thought of what was right for the institution and separate that feeling from personal concerns or fears of appearance or senior judgement of a decision or action.
BD: What does the Crozier/TR incident say about Navy culture? Is there a possibility that it will have a chilling effect on bold leadership?
MJ: I think it will definitely have a chilling effect on leadership in general, not just bold leadership. In and of itself, these actions wouldn’t be much. When combined with two oft-repeated statements in the wake of the 2017 collisions and subsequent reports the signal – intended or not – is clear “do your job and don’t ask or question.”
MJ: I think it will definitely have a chilling effect on leadership in general, not just bold leadership. In and of itself, these actions wouldn’t be much. When combined with two oft-repeated statements in the wake of the 2017 collisions and subsequent reports the signal – intended or not – is clear “do your job and don’t ask or question.”
CO CAPT Crozier washes crew's dishes aboard TR for Thanksgiving. |
MJ: Undue influence is only a problem when the subordinate leader allows that influence to affect judgment or action. If the first thought is “what will my boss think” then there is a problem, but it’s not the senior’s problem. But, the senior created the problem and must act proactively to solve it, if the senior desires to. Sometimes senior influence is necessary to right a wrong – sometimes different people have different ideas of what right or wrong is.
There is a great article called “Lawful Command Influence” that speaks to the “appropriate actions commanders or staff members can take within the military justice process to ensure good order and discipline is maintained within the ranks.” And this is not a new issue for any military service or government – it just is.
As different people and generations and legal regimes change, as norms alter, we have to relearn what is proper, right, and correct within the law. But, in general the right and proper thing hasn’t changed much in the past century. The biggest changes in legal action are around race, gender, and sexuality – but what was right and wrong really isn’t different.
Meeting Commander United States Forces Korea, Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, 2018. |
MJ: Civilian control is imperative in a democracy or any free government and I do not think it is at all tenuous. The best way to make it stronger is to encourage open and vigorous discussion, even debate.
I’ve seen too many adherents to civ-mil relations dismiss another point of view because the individual making it is military and not academic, or academic and not military, or not-Huntington, or something other than actually addressing the core argument.
I think it is also important to keep the work of civ-mil relations limited to the linkage between the military and civilian government. Many now conflate the concept of civ-mil to include civil society and it shouldn’t.
There should be a study of the military’s relationship to society (and vice versa) but it shouldn’t be civ-mil – that’s military to civilian government. Likewise, there should be study of society’s relationship towards government.
Harry Summers [author of "On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War" (1982)"] misunderstood much of Clausewitz, but his redefined trinity has some value and the relationships between and among military, government, and society need discussion.*
BD: Similarly, why is it critical to keep an independent and strong Navy – as bold leaders fought for 70 years ago in the Revolt of the Admirals?
MJ: If we want to “play the away game” and be proactive about it, then we need a Navy. A strong Navy. It’s too late to start building a Navy after the first shots are fired.
The founders understood this and is why the Constitution requires that Congress must “maintain a Navy” and “raise an Army” though there is a lot of latitude there.
Another important leader who understood this was Franklin D. Roosevelt. He began a Navy buildup in 1934 - with further authorizations in 1938 and 1940 with a planned military capability for 1943, and that’s the path the USA followed in the war.
Then-USS Reagan XO CAPT Crozier participates in general quarters drill in 2015. (MC3 N. Burke) |
MJ: I’m not sure it’s courage so much as stubbornness and a little brashness. I have always believed in three things – intellectual honesty (truth), personal choice, and seeing the world the way it could be. I rarely press for a world as it “should” be, because that violates personal choice. I don’t like fooling people into doing something because that’s not intellectually honest.
As a Navy and a profession we are either strong, confident, and honest enough to choose telling the truth – varnished or not – or we aren’t. (See Q5 for some linkage here)
If leaders aren't strong enough to speak “truth to power” then are they really leading? Or are they really just good and diligent followers? And, when someone asks an “uncomfortable question” or “speaks truth to power” leaders need to ask themselves – why is this question uncomfortable? Why is someone disagreeing with me? That’s the secret part of humility as a leader – being open to the idea that you don’t have all the answers, which means listening to and considering critics.
BD: Overall, it seems the Navy has done a remarkable job responding to the COVID-19 crisis, from informing the fleet and families, deploying USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort, providing Navy Medicine personnel, and dealing with deployments. How important is coronavirus testing of Sailors and Navy civilians to keeping readiness at the highest level?
MJ: I really try and stay out of the COVID discussions – we learn so much every day that what is said tomorrow is likely either wrong or out of context by tomorrow or the next week. What we must do is remain vigilant, remain flexible, and clearly recognize that the world has changed and seek to capitalize on that change rather than an attempt at returning to the status quo ante.
BD: Thank you for a list of books and authors in our first interview. Expanding on that, what books do you recommend specifically on virtue, especially for Navy readers? As you said, "seeking virtue is a lifelong quest." Would you also share your recommended maritime books and authors?
MJ:
Virtue:
"After Virtue," Alisdair Macintyre
"The Character Gap," Christian Miller
"Practical Wisdom," Barry Schwartz
Maritime Books:
Tom Clancy's "Hunt For Red October, Red Storm Rising"
David Poyer’s Dan Lenson Series
PT Deutermann's “Scorpion in the Sea”
Herman Wouk: “The Caine Mutiny,” “Winds of War” and “War and Remembrance”
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Just the titles of Junge's recommendations – "After Virtue," "Practical Wisdom" and "The Character Gap" – resonate in this COVID era of fear, mistrust of science, and the erosion of rule of law, integrity and leadership norms.
A big thank you to CAPT Junge for sharing his time and insights with Navy Reads, an unofficial blog in support of reading, critical thinking and the Navy's Professional Reading Program. Also, thank you to the mass communication specialists who helped show CAPT Crozier at the bridge, deck plates and in key leadership positions. Crozier is a profile in courage.
MJ: I really try and stay out of the COVID discussions – we learn so much every day that what is said tomorrow is likely either wrong or out of context by tomorrow or the next week. What we must do is remain vigilant, remain flexible, and clearly recognize that the world has changed and seek to capitalize on that change rather than an attempt at returning to the status quo ante.
BD: Thank you for a list of books and authors in our first interview. Expanding on that, what books do you recommend specifically on virtue, especially for Navy readers? As you said, "seeking virtue is a lifelong quest." Would you also share your recommended maritime books and authors?
MJ:
Virtue:
"After Virtue," Alisdair Macintyre
"The Character Gap," Christian Miller
"Practical Wisdom," Barry Schwartz
Maritime Books:
Tom Clancy's "Hunt For Red October, Red Storm Rising"
David Poyer’s Dan Lenson Series
PT Deutermann's “Scorpion in the Sea”
Herman Wouk: “The Caine Mutiny,” “Winds of War” and “War and Remembrance”
--------------------------
Just the titles of Junge's recommendations – "After Virtue," "Practical Wisdom" and "The Character Gap" – resonate in this COVID era of fear, mistrust of science, and the erosion of rule of law, integrity and leadership norms.
A big thank you to CAPT Junge for sharing his time and insights with Navy Reads, an unofficial blog in support of reading, critical thinking and the Navy's Professional Reading Program. Also, thank you to the mass communication specialists who helped show CAPT Crozier at the bridge, deck plates and in key leadership positions. Crozier is a profile in courage.
* Harry G. Summers was interviewed at the Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, in 1996 and responded to point of view of the founders' intent of the military to be controlled by the people and their representatives, acknowledging that it was "implicit in their design for our government." Summers said, "Yes, and explicit as well in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which makes it very clear that the American military is a creature of the Congress, not of the executive branch. The Congress has absolute power over its very existence. Clausewitz laid it out in the early nineteenth century when he differentiated between eighteenth-century war – which was a matter for kings and presidents and princes, and the people were just observers – and nineteenth-century war as a matter of what he called "the remarkable trinity of the people, the government, and the army." That observation, a very profound observation that he drew out of the French Revolution, had been drawn almost fifty years earlier in the American Revolution and incorporated into our Constitution. We are a trinitarian military in the true sense of the word – which has enormous ramifications for the commitment of U.S. military power and for U.S. military policy."
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