Crozier, Rickover & 'Crimes of Command'

Review by Bill Doughty–

Rickover in 1922

One hundred years ago, in the midst of the Great Influenza global pandemic, Midshipman Hyman G. Rickover was studying at the Naval Academy. He'd arrived in Annapolis in 1918, but before he could take classes he was quarantined with what was diagnosed as diphtheria. He had to bend the rules to study, but he succeeded, survived the Academy (and the pandemic), and graduated.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt III – TR's grandson – presented a diploma to Rickover (along with more than five hundred classmates) in 1922. 

Rickover changed the culture of the Navy toward higher standards in inspections, safety and training. He championed nuclear propulsion and became the father of the nuclear Navy.

He also helped change Navy's concept of responsibility, according to Michael Junge* in "Crimes of Command: In the United States Navy 1945-2015" (printed in the United States of America, 2018; ISBN 978-1721230068). Ironically, just as Rickover did, Junge stresses the importance of the meaning of words like "responsibility." Junge writes:

"Navy culture has lost the ability to properly separate and distinguish between culpability, accountability, and responsibility. Navy culture no longer fully understands ethics and ethical dilemmas. Navy culture now sees administration and bureaucratization as professionalism. These issues are interrelated, but all lead to one inescapable conclusion – Navy culture must change. Navy culture must rediscover the core of its language. It must understand the truth behind the myth and rhetoric of command if it is to continue into the future and remain relevant. Making these changes will come from those who have both experience and education, practice and theory – from those who can properly perceive a situation, have the appropriate feelings about it, can properly deliberate about what was appropriate in those circumstances, and to act."

Junge says, "When combined with lax language, the Navy is rife for a culture of 'ready, fire, aim' responses to crimes of command." He explores the "ethics of military virtue," referring to works from psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and others, including Richard D. White, Ruth Benedict, Peter E. Langford, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg and Samuel Huntington.

Quoting authors Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe, he writes, "An ethical dilemma arises when two or more competing values are important and in conflict.'" Although some leaders in the military place the highest value in obedience and blind loyalty to the chain of command, what is a commander to do when faced with "loyalty to a superior or to the crew"?

"Ethics is about 'figuring out the right way to do the right thing in a particular circumstance, with a particular person, at a particular time.'"

CAPT Crozier, 'GOAT'

Skipper Crozier aboard TR, March 3, 2020. (MCSN Kaylianna Genier).

Captain Brett Crozier, until several days ago the commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), faced a moral and ethical dilemma when a relatively small but growing number of his nearly 5,000 crew tested positive for the coronavirus, and he asked for help from his chain of command to save lives. [Just a reminder that Navy Reads is an unofficial blog, and unquoted comments here are my own.]

On March 30, Crozier wrote a three-and-a-half page letter – not five pages as claimed by his commander in chief, President Trump, who mocked the letter as a work of "literature" April 4 during a nationally televised press conference. “I thought it was terrible what he did, to write a letter. This isn’t a class on literature," Trump told reporters.

Crozier asked clearly for "decisive action" after days of attempting to get help in protecting his Sailors as the spread of the virus accelerated. His letter got immediate action but also resulted in the acting Secretary of the Navy firing him and removing him from his ship. Acting Navy Secretary Modly fired him for allegedly causing a "firestorm" when the request for help was published.

At Saturday's COVID-19 press conference, Trump questioned the wisdom of doing a visit to Vietnam March 5. "I guess the captain stopped in Vietnam and people got off in Vietnam,” Trump said. “Perhaps you don’t do that in the middle of a pandemic or something that looked like it was going to be. History would say you don’t necessarily stop and let your sailors get off.”

Modly and Trump at Naval Academy graduation, May 25, 2018. (CPL H. Clay)

At the same time that the TR was in Vietnam, back in the United States Trump participated in an extended phone interview on Fox News March 4, in which he said about coronavirus, "I started hearing about it very quietly a couple of months ago from China and I said, 'Wow, I hope that doesn't happen here.'"

He told host Sean Hannity: "I just say it's a very very small number in our country," and "A lot of things have happened that have been very fortunate. We are doing a good job."

Downplaying the severity of the virus, Trump said on March 4, "Now, and this is just my hunch, and – but based on a lot of conversations with a lot of people that do this. Because a lot people will have this and it's very mild. They'll get better very rapidly. They don't even see a doctor. They don't even call a doctor," Trump said. "You never hear about those people. So you can't put them down in the category of the overall population in terms of this corona flu and or virus. So you just can't do that," he continued. "So if, you know, we have thousands or hundreds of thousands of people that get better, just by, you know, sitting around and even going to work – some of them go to work but they get better."

Media in Vietnam meet dignitaries, including Ambassador Kritenbrink and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Adm. Aquilino, at the arrival of  USS Theodore Roosevelt’s (CVN 71) and the USS Bunker Hill’s (CG 52) arrival in Da Nang, Vietnam, March 5, 2020. (Photo by MC3 Brandon Richardson)

Meanwhile, in Vietnam at that same time, Sailors were encouraged by their chain of command to participate in cultural and professional exchanges, community service projects, sports competitions, and receptions during the port visit, including at the invitation of Trump-appointed U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Daniel Kritenbrink who met with senior Navy officers and various media during the visit.

Who is to "blame" for TR visiting Vietnam? Who is responsible for not responding immediately to CAPT Crozier's desperate pleas for help for his crew as his Sailors became sick? Was Crozier punished for speaking truth to power?

Capt. Brett Crozier, commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), sits inside the cockpit of an F/A-18E Super Hornet, assigned to the “Blue Diamonds” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 146, Nov. 13, 2019, aboard Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71).  (MC3 Nicholas Huynh)

Skipper Crozier's bio and web presence show a stellar, accomplished and gifted naval aviator and leader of leaders – a graduate of the Naval Academy, trained in nuclear power, with an advanced degree from the Naval War College. He served in Hawaii; in CONUS; in Naples, Italy with NATO; and in Iwakuni and Yokosuka, Japan. While aboard USS Nimitz he supported Operation Iraqi Freedom. And he served as the Executive Officer of USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) till July 2016. During that tour USS Reagan took part in RIMPAC 2014 and came to Yokosuka to relieve USS George Washington (CVN 73). Crozier then served as commanding officer aboard USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), flagship of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, before becoming TR's CO November 1, 2019.

His Sailors call him GOAT: Greatest Of All Time. They cheered him as he departed his ship.

In late-breaking news, it is reported today that Crozier himself has tested positive for the COVID virus.

What's the Real Crime

Junge (again, not intended to be referring to Crozier) wrote this about Navy's tendency to figuratively eat its own:

"The Navy must remember that commanders, competent commanders, are in short supply. The rarity of command in itself means that every commander has valuable, and rare, experience. By removing and discarding virtually all commanders who commit crimes of command the Navy wastes precious resources. Chester Nimitz's and William Raborn's contributions testify to the potential value lost when the Navy sent Kirk Lippold [USS Cole (DDG 67) CO], Glenn Brindel [USS Stark (FFG 31)], Walter Shafer [USS Belknap (CG 26) CO], and over a hundred other commanders home over the last three decades rather than afford them an opportunity at redemption."

He says the Navy now favors "retribution and removal" over "remorse and rehabilitation." And he asks, "Are officers who protect the Navy from airing dirty laundry loyal to the institution, or disloyal to the country?" 

As a reminder, the nation's first whistleblowers were Sailors.

In the U.S. Naval War College Review ("Leadership and Decision—From Accountability to Punishment," Naval War College Review: Spring 2020; Vol. 73: No. 2, Article 5) Junge graphs and compares the "number of officers forgiven or allowed rehabilitation." It's clear that CO removals are way up in recent years.



He writes, “In the modern Navy, a commander is most likely to be removed for personal misconduct or when the crime of command includes one or all of the following elements: death, press coverage, or significant damage to the Navy, whether materially or to its reputation.”

Junge notes, "Because commanders are now judged via an administrative process during which they enjoy fewer rights than they would in a judicial process, removal for personal misconduct is lumped in with operational incidents."

Junge's book was written well before the current pandemic, obviously. He mentions personal individual actions such as infidelity and alcohol incidents. But the book focuses primarily on "crimes" such as shipboard accidents and ship and submarine collisions, allisions and groundings. We read about accidents by Bainbridge and Barry from the Navy's early history and see how they were forgiven and fondly remembered. Mullen and Nimitz similarly rose from what could be called career-ending incidents during a more forgiving time.

Junge reminds us of the fate of USS Indianapolis (CA 35) and its captain, Charles B. McVay, III, who was pilloried for not zigzagging his ship in order to avoid enemy torpedoes. And we learn about USS Hobson (DMS 26), cut in half by USS Wasp (CV 18) in 1952, with 176 Sailors killed, including the captain. Junge provides examples of significant incidents, including among others, those involving USS McFaul (DDG 74) and USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) in 2008, USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110) in 2013, and separate collisions involving USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) in 2017.

Junge sees a change in naval culture in 1965-1985, a period where "individual responsibility was replaced with an idea of culpability for the CO, for simply being in command."

He notes that Rickover's shadow was long. Five of the previous eleven Chiefs of Naval Operations being officers who Rickover had interviewed and in some cases personally mentored.

Such was the case for CNOs Adm. James L. Holloway III and especially Adm. James D. Watkins, who, with Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, codified the "first open and official linkage of authority, responsibility, and accountability and their indivisible nature."

"Watkins also took Rickover's ideas outside the Navy," Junge writes. "After retiring as CNO, Watkins remained active in government, first as chairman of the Reagan commission on the HIV epidemic, then as Secretary of Energy for President George H.W. Bush." 

Watkins, echoing Rickover, once wrote, "The doctrine of accountability has always been a part of command and a very active part of that doctrine is that you cannot delegate responsibility and authority to another." The man at the top, according to that view, should be responsible, accountable and culpable.

Core Values, Including ...

Junge offers a nuanced perspective to ethical military virtue. He says "the Navy must return to a time when a commander can commit a crime of command, be judged and afforded an opportunity to seek and receive forgiveness; an opportunity for redemption." 

In fact, he suggests another core value for the Navy along with honor, courage and commitment: forgiveness. And he bases his suggestion in part on theology, citing Jesus Christ, and also in science, showing research in ethics and morality.

For example, Kohlberg identified three levels of moral development, each with two stages. "At the lowest level, individuals are self-centered and amoral, focused on not being caught and punished," Junge writes.

"Most military personnel fit within Level II, Stages 3 or 4. Rules are clear cut, group approval is desired, and authority is respected," Junge says. If a person has more fully evolved, he or she can achieve a level of enlightened moral development. "Stage 5 accepts legal authority, but also seeks to change unjust laws. Stage 5 is the core basis or ideals of American morality."

"While Rickover created Level II organizations, he did not operate at that level." Because he had been quarantined he was behind in his studies at Annapolis. "When he returned to class he was behind, and in order to catch up Rickover violated academy rules to study after taps." Far from being a two-dimensional caricature, Rickover was complicated; he even knew how to forgive others, as Junge shows.

Junge's book, available on Kindle at Amazon, is rich in history, psychology and critical thinking. Readers are asked to consider the true meanings of responsibility, accountability and culpability. Junge introduces readers to a rich resource of authors and books, and he reminds us of the words of Adm. Arleigh Burke: "A commander who fails to exceed his authority is not much use to his subordinates."

As this blog goes online, CAPT Crozier faces possible disciplinary action in an apparent expedited investigation. But his Sailors aboard TR are more protected and are now receiving COVID-19 tests.

(*Michael Junge is an active duty Navy Captain with degrees from the United States Naval Academy, United States Naval War College, the George Washington University, and Salve Regina University.  He served afloat in USS Moosbrugger (DD 980), USS Underwood (FFG 36), USS Wasp (LHD 1), USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) and was the 14th Commanding Officer of USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). Ashore he served with Navy Recruiting; Assault Craft Unit 4; as Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, Marine Corps; as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks (N6); and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is a military professor at the U.S. Naval War College.)

Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class Michael Lusk, from Baltimore, takes a swab sample for COVID-19 testing aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), April 1, 2020.  (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Dartañon D. De La Garza/Released)

Seabees assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 1 and NMCB 5 coordinate transportation of Sailors assigned to the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) who have tested negative for COVID-19 and are asymptomatic from Naval Base Guam to Government of Guam and military-approved commercial lodging. Sailors will be required to remain in quarantine in their assigned lodging for at least 14 days, in accordance with DoD directive and the Governor’s executive order. The vehicles departed the pier and picked up Theodore Roosevelt Sailors who had previously been isolated from the ship at locations on board Naval Base Guam. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Matthew R. White/Released)