Now More Than Ever: 'Back Channel' Diplomacy!

Review by Bill Doughty

It turns out bagging groceries in a military commissary is a good step in preparing for a career in diplomacy.

Career Ambassador William J. Burns

Such was the beginning of a life of service for military brat William J. Burns, who became a diplomat serving before, during and after 9/11. He held senior U.S. State Department leadership positions during the killing of Osama bin Laden, the rise of Putin, the Arab Spring, growth of China, and the challenges of Iran's nuclear threats.

Burns shows how life as a military dependent can widen the aperture – providing an individual with an understanding of the world and an appreciation of human rights. He recounts people, events and consequences in "The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Call for Its Renewal" by William J. Burns (Penguin Random House, 2019).

"Public service was already in my blood. I grew up as an Army brat, the product of an itinerant military childhood that took my family from one end of the United States to the other, with a dozen moves and three high schools by the time I was seventeen," Burns writes.

His father, who served in Vietnam and became a two-star general in the Army, told him, "Nothing can make you prouder than serving your country with honor." Frequent moves at an early age and traveling overseas also helped a young Burns gain insights about his country.

Burns became a diplomat in President Ronald Reagan's and George Shultz's State Department. He served under both Presidents Bush and with Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. He held key positions in the Middle East, as Ambassador to Russia and as a State Department leader in Washington D.C., retiring in 2014 as Deputy Secretary of State and Career Ambassador. (Today he is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.)

This book is a must-read for diplomats – including diplomat-sailors/soldiers – who seek to understand "great power rivalry," the Iran nuclear deal, challenges in Asia and eastern Europe, the "frustration seething beneath so many authoritarian Arab societies" and why the U.S.-led war in Iraq was such a mistake.

Burns, who worked directly for Gen. Colin Powell, is clear in his accounting:

"The Iraq invasion was the original sin. It was born of hubris, as well as failures of imagination and process. For neoconservative proponents, it was the key tool in the disruption of the Middle East – the heady, irresponsible, and historically unmoored notion that shaking things up violently would produce better outcomes. In a region where unintended consequences were rarely uplifting, the toppling of Saddam set off a chain reaction of troubles. It laid bare the fragilities and dysfunctions of Iraq as well as the wider Arab state system – proving that Americans could be just as arrogant and haphazard in their impact on Middle East maps as the original British and French mapmakers."

He asks, "What if we had tried to harness the massive outpouring of international goodwill and shared concern for the terrible attacks of September 11 in a different – more constructive – direction?"

"The eighteen months between 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq were one of those hinge points in history, whose contours are easier to see today than they were at that uncertain and emotional time. If we had avoided the debacle in Iraq, and instead projected American power and purpose more wisely, it seems obvious today that American interests and values would have been better served. That would have required a real attempt at coercive diplomacy in Iraq – not the one we employed, which was long on coercion and short on diplomacy. That would also have required patience in our diplomacy and a readiness to share in its design and execution. Instead, we opted for the more immediate satisfactions of unilateral impulses and blunt force, and kept the sharing part to a minimum. It was beyond our power and imagination to remake the Middle East, with our without the overthrow of Saddam, but we could certainly make an already disordered region worse and further erode our leadership and influence. And we did."

Will we do the same in Iran?

Yeoman 2nd Class DeMario Smith places flowers at the Stark Memorial plaque during the guided-missile frigate USS Stark (FFG 31) remembrance ceremony at the Naval Station Mayport. On May 17, 1987, while on a routine patrol in the Persian Gulf, USS Stark was struck by two Iraqi missiles killing 37 Sailors. Despite the damage inflicted, the efforts of the Stark's crew saved the ship. Stark was later decommissioned in 1999. (Photo by MC2 Damian Berg)

Burns recounts the following tragedies while he was in the State Department: the bombing of U.S. Marine Barracks in Lebanon that killed 241 Marines; the Arms for Hostages debacle with Iran; Iraq's attack on USS Stark (FFG-31) that killed 37 Sailors; the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) mine incident that wounded ten Sailors, the attack on the American embassy Benghazi, Libya that killed four Americans including Ambassador Chris Stevens; and Russian ongoing meddling in other countries' affairs.

"Putin had a remarkable capacity for storing up grievances and slights ... Putin was an apostle of payback," Burns writes. Putin is described as "cocky, cranky, aggrieved and insecure." He is the "anti-Yeltsin, half a generation younger, sober, ruthlessly competent, hardworking and hard-faced."

Adm. John Poindexter (Photo from NHHC)

Burns offers terse yet deep descriptions of individuals, especially colleagues:

• Donald Rumsfeld – "Supremely confident but unfettered by much knowledge of the region (Middle East)."
• George Shultz – "Impressive integrity and intellect ... Shultz was a firm believer in the importance of 'tending the garden' in diplomacy."
• John Whitehead – (who served in the U.S. Navy during WWII and participated in the D-Day Invasion) "Self-assured and thoroughly decent."
• Adm. John Poindexter – "Became Reagan's fourth NSC chief in four years at the end of 1985. A decent man with a nuclear engineer's exacting intellect, Poindexter was badly miscast in the role."
• Lawrence Eagleburger – "A rumpled, blunt-spoken, chain-smoking foreign service veteran, sometimes bursting at the seams of his disproportionally sized pinstriped suits."
• Richard Holbrooke – "Was a brilliant diplomat, whose talents and drive were matched only by his showmanship and sense of self."
• Adm. Bill McRaven – "It was impossible not to feel his confidence."

Burns was in the Situation Room Sunday, May 1, 2011, along with his boss, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, after President Obama approved the raid by McRaven's SEALs on bin Laden's compound in Pakistan.

"At 2:30 p.m., we watched on a small video map as two Black Hawk helicopters took off for Abbottabad from Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. The next couple hours seemed like an eternity, and the raid itself began with gut-wrenching drama, when one of the two helicopters made a hard landing in the courtyard of the compound. The SEALs were unhurt, but they had to destroy the helicopter and adapt quickly. McRaven narrated the whole operation with incredible calm from a command post in Afghanistan. As the president and his senior aides sat in rapt attention, there wasn't a hint of second-guessing or backseat commentary. Then McRaven's voice came on the line to confirm 'E-KIA' – the enemy had been killed in action. Bin Laden was dead. Never have I been prouder of the U.S. military, or of a president who had so coolly taken such a big risk. For a diplomat accustomed to long slogs and victories at the margins, this was an incredible moment."

In the Situation Room May 1, 2011 as President Obama and his National Security team observe the SEAL raid on bin Laden's compound. (Pete Souza, WH)

Burns thinks military strikes against Syria should have been ordered after President Bashar Assad deployed chemical weapons in his country's civil war. But President Obama insisted on getting congressional authorization. "Few Republicans wanted to be helpful to Obama, and many Democrats were uneasy, afflicted by 2003 Iraq War déjà vu."

"Hindsight neither diminishes the continuing pain and cost of Syria's civil war," Burns writes, "nor illuminates any easy choices for policymakers."

Burns presents the incredibly nuanced strategies and tactics involved in nuclear arms talks, including especially with Iran. He also describes the Gordian knot of Syria, Israel, Egypt and, to a lesser degree in this book, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

In 2013 General Jim Mattis famously advised Congress, "If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition." Burns notes, "The savaging of American diplomacy as the Trump administration consolidated its grip was not the first such assault in our history, but it was in many ways the worst."

Seated: Former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger, James Baker, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry and others participate in the dedication of the George Marshall Conference Center at the Harry S. Truman Building, Sept. 3, 2014. (Photo by Ken Richards, DOS, DVIDS)

Still, Burns is optimistic about America's advantages going forward, with an assessment that might make Mahan, Kaplan and Friedman smile:

"Our assets are substantial. We still spend more every year on defense than the next seven countries combined. Our economy, despite risks of overheating and persistent inequalities, remains the biggest, most adaptable, and most innovative in the world. Energy, once a vulnerability, now offers considerable advantages, with technology unlocking vast natural gas resources, and advances in clean and renewable energy accelerating. Demography is another strength. Compared to our peer competitors, our population is younger and more mobile, and if we could stop doing so much practical and moral damage to ourselves on immigration issues we could lock in that strategic edge for generations. Geography sets us apart, with our two liquid assets – the Pacific and Atlantic oceans – insulating us to some extent from the kinds of security threats that expose other major powers. Diplomacy ought to be another advantage. We have more allies and potential partners than any of our peers or rivals, with greater capacity for coalition-building and problem-solving."

While Burns acknowledges the current problems and challenges of American diplomacy, and recommends a return to core values of judgment, balance and discipline. He recommends adopting U.S. military employment of "systematic case studies and after-action reports." And he calls for making a connection with the American public about the importance and relevance of global diplomacy to citizens' daily lives.

At a fundamental – and relatable – level, diplomacy can prevent war. Burns shows in this book how a study of history and diplomacy can promote cooperation between increasingly connected nations, ensuring a safer and more prosperous world – for everyone, from commissary baggers to presidents.