Review by Bill Doughty––
In “War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait” (Columbia University Press, 2022), Scott L. Kastner examines the likelihood of conflict in Asia. However, readers may find themselves thinking about the actual war in Europe. More about that in a moment…
Kastner’s well-researched book considers the possibility that the People’s Republic of China will take military action –– in the form of a military blockade or outright invasion –– against the democratic citizens of Taiwan (a country which has has been, in reality, an independent nation since 1949).
Kastner presents a brief history of the formation of Republic of China after the civil war of 1949, including Taiwan's flirtation with autocracy and martial law and eventual full embrace of democracy. Then he gets to the heart of his thesis: that there is a balance between sovereignty and reunification, with “status quo” as the fulcrum keeping peace, and with ambiguous options clouding an uncertain future.
The power balance in the region, he notes, has changed in recent years as China’s economy and military have grown –– along with nationalism. “Although the balance of power has clearly shifted in Beijing’s favor, attempting to seize and occupy Taiwan would still represent a highly risky and costly undertaking that might fail spectacularly.”
A key to preventing war, many analysts believe, is deterrence, predicated on the strength of the economy and military of the United States, which is committed to maintaining peace and cooperation on the global commons.
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said recently, “As long as we remain number one, then we will deter the war that people worry about, a great power war between China and the United States.”
Kastner writes:
“The U.S. Navy has announced numerous transits through the Taiwan Strait over the past few years, including several by guided missile destroyers; these high-profile transits could also indicate some strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan security ties. The frequency of transits has varied considerably over time, however, and long-term trends (at least over the past decade and a half) are ambiguous. Transits occurred on average 5.5. times per year from 2007 to 2010, increased to nearly 10 per year from 2011 to 2016 on average, and dropped to 4 per year from 2017 to 2018, before increasing sharply in 2019 and 2020. On the other hand, the recent uptick in transits is notable, and it is worth highlighting as well that U.S. officials have begun to announce these transits on a regular basis –– whereas in the past they typically went unannounced.”
Kastner also examines the commitment by the U.S. Congress and American presidents to supporting Taiwan's security. (This book was apparently published just before former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s notable visit to Taipei last year.)
Kastner notes, “U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken warned in April 2021 that it would be ‘a serious mistake for anyone to try to change the existing status quo by force.’”
Still, XI and Communist China threatens invasion by force if the One-China policy is not realized. While Kastner contends “war is not inevitable,” he has an ominous observation:
“Were armed conflict to occur in the Taiwan Strait, at its root would be an intractable sovereignty dispute that has persisted since the end of the Chinese Civil War. In its current manifestation, the dispute centers on Taiwan’s status: whether Taiwan should be considered part of China now, and whether it should be formally unified with mainland China in the future. The PRC views itself as the sole legal government of China, Taiwan as part of China in principle, and formal unification as an important national goal. While Beijing has embraced a policy of ‘peaceful unification,’ it has refused to renounce the use of force and has explicitly threatened to go to war if Taiwan were to formally declare its independence from China, be occupied by foreign forces, or delay –– indefinitely –– negotiations over formal unification. In Taiwan, even though individuals have widely divergent views on cross-Strait policy, and even though the two major parties differ considerably in their approach to China, there nevertheless exists wide agreement that Taiwan (or the ROC) is a sovereign state, and there is very little support for near-term unification with the PRC.”
Kastner concludes ominously, “Absent a dramatic change in circumstances, then, there is little prospect for the two sides peacefully resolving the underlying dispute.”
Does Taiwan rhyme with Hong Kong?
The citizens of Taiwan see what is unfolding in Hong Kong –– as China cracks down on democracy and independence there. They want no part of the loss of freedom they see there and in Tibet, another formerly autonomous region, as a result of China's political system, management, and control.
In Hong Kong, new PRC laws allow interference in the judicial system and schools. Independent newspapers and voices are shut down. Security officers patrol the streets. "The undercutting of autonomy in Hong Kong sends an especially troubling signal to Taiwan given that Beijing also calls its proposed formula for Taiwan "one China, two systems."
Does Taiwan rhyme with Korea?
In North Korea, “Supreme Leader” Kim Jong-un threatens ethnically identical South Koreans. Kastner compares the U.S. promise to support Taiwan with the “iron-clad” commitment to defend the Republic of Korea if attacked by autocratic Communist North Korea, as happened in 1950.
[Recently, the world learned that North Korea, which is still supported by China, is providing weapons to Russia’s Wagner Group in support of Putin’s war of terrorism in Ukraine.]
Does Taiwan rhyme with Ukraine?
In Europe, Putin kills and terrorizes the people of Ukraine despite their same ethnicity.
Just as the PRC sees Taiwan as critical to its expansion throughout Asia, Putin sees Ukraine as a strategic bulwark against the West and his revanchist goals in Eastern Europe.
Meanwhile, the Communist Party observes Ukraine and sees how Putin’s war continues to backfire: instead of an easy takeover, he has lost tens of thousands of soldiers; instead of weakening NATO and the West, he has strengthened the free world’s resolve; and instead of reunification, he is causing deep rifts within his own country.
One year ago, the world was still hopeful that Putin’s threats, maneuvers, and calls for “unification” would not lead to war despite his previous invasions of Georgia and Crimea. Today, we see Russia’s campaign of terrorism and violence continue as the war nears its one year anniversary.
China must be as surprised as Putin in seeing Ukraine's resolve and the free world’s coalition led by President Biden with the support of the U.S. Congress. So far.
Just this week, the Biden administration authorized sending 30 Abrams tanks to Ukraine; Germany announced it is sending dozens of Leopard 2 tanks.
Does Taiwan rhyme with Finland?
Seeing the parallels between Taiwan and Ukraine becomes clearer through the lens of the history of the Soviet Union, including what happened in the Winter War between the USSR and Finland in 1939 (ten years before Chinese nationalists fled to Taiwan). The Soviets invaded ethnically similar Finland, at the same time that Germany did the same to its neighbors in Central Europe.
Citing the conclusions of Stanford’s James D. Fearon, Kastner writes about the dangers of accommodation and appeasement and why a country may choose to “roll the dice” and accept war over loss of territory or independence.
“Fearon suggests the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland can be explained in part by this dynamic, where Finland preferred to fight rather than yield to Soviet demands to cede some small islands in the Gulf of Finland that Moscow viewed as strategically important: here, Helsinki feared that ceding the islands would give the USSR more leverage to demand further concessions in the future, and Stalin presumably couldn’t be trusted to honor a promise not to do so. Leaders in Taiwan will likewise be reluctant to accommodate the PRC by yielding ground on the island’s sovereign status, unless they can be confident that Beijing could be trusted to honor commitments not to take advantage of the increased bargaining power such accommodation would provide. Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons to doubt the credibility of PRC promises in this regard…”
As for the possibility of actual war between China and Taiwan, Kastner admits pessimism but says conflict is not inevitable. He notes the precariousness of Taiwan’s position: unable to declare total independence as a sovereign nation but also unable to appease China, which would risk losing freedom and democracy for its people.
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USS Antietam (CG-54) and USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) transit the Taiwan Strait in August 2022. (MC2 Justin Stack) |
Prevention of conflict, Kastner says, depends on good communication and information, as well as continued credible commitment to deterrence in the name of peace [to echo Gen. Milley].
“If the United States were to abandon Taiwan,” Kastner writes, “the risk of cross-strait war would likely increase.” There may be no evidence that Mark Twain ever said, “History never repeats itself, but it does often rhyme.” But in an unpublished manuscript, “Mark Twain in Eruption,” he did write that “It is not worthwhile to try to keep history from repeating itself, for man’s character will always make the preventing of the repetitions impossible.”
In “War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait” Kastner includes a huge section of historical and analytical notes and another lengthy set of references, including Shelley Rigger, Michael Beckley, Jessica Chen Weiss, Qiang Xin, Robert Sutter, Alan Romberg, Russell Hsiao, Richard C. Bush, Thomas J. Christensen, T. Y. Wang, and James D. Fearon, among dozens of other experts.
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of analysis in this book of the role and importance of Japan, not to mention other nations such as the Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of the Philippines and as part of the strategic balance in the region. Kastner admits early in his introduction that his work is an overall analysis, not an evaluation of military strategy, weapons systems, or potential PRC planning. Still, for Navy readers this book presents a worthwhile examination of ambiguity and precariousness in the Taiwan Strait.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley speak at the eighth Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Jan. 20, 2023. The meeting brought together representatives from more than 50 nations and organizations to determine the best way to get the military capabilities that Ukraine needs to repel Russian forces from their sovereign territory. (DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jack Sanders)