‘General Naval Tactics: Theory and Practice’

Review by Bill Doughty

Warfighting occurs in a multidimensional, multi-domain universe –– a matrix of possibilities, challenges, and surprises, more art than science. Success in the maritime battle space depends on balancing three components of “the art of war at sea.”

“Naval tactics is one of three components of that art; the other two are naval/maritime strategy and operational art.” The components are interdependent and reliant –– most importantly –– on the human factor. That’s the revelation in Milan Vego’s “General Naval Tactics: Theory and Practice” (Naval Institute Press, 2020), an indispensable book for any commander or naval officer whose goal is to be a senior leader of leaders.

This book presents a nuts and bolts discussion of objectives, methods, and elements of tactics as well as design, leadership, targets, and other vital considerations.

But throughout the discussion, Vego emphasizes the importance of incorporating theory and an understanding of people together with hardware and tactics. “Experience shows that a naval officer is far better prepared to apply tactical doctrine and to use it creatively.” That means having an appreciation of psychology, philosophy, history, and epistemology. “The most common error is an over emphasis on the importance of matériel in naval warfare,” Vego writes, adding that over-reliance on untested technology and mere pockets of information can be dangerous, too.

Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Mike Gilday, right, speaks to Sailors after the Cyber Foundry ribbon cutting Feb. 18, 2020. The Cyber Foundry is a development site for some of the U.S. Navy’s cyber-warfare capabilities by combining a modern physical environment, trained and experienced personnel, industry-leading processes and updated technology resources to enable the rapid development of offensive cyber capabilities. (Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class William Sykes)

Information itself can a weapon. This month, in fact, we learned of cyber attacks reportedly by Russia against the United States. Vego outlines how tactical information warfare is conducted in the cyber warfighting domain and how electronic warfare, psychological operations and operational security are part of tactical protection in information warfare.

“One of the key requirements for effective tactical IW is timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence. Among other things, intelligence support of IW analyzes the enemy C2 [command and control] process and determines enemy IW capabilities. Intelligence supports IW through the collection, evaluation, analysis, and integration of all available information concerning the enemy’s capabilities. Capabilities to collect, evaluate, analyze, and transmit intelligence information have increased exponentially with the development of surveillance sensors, computers, and communications. The overall effectiveness of intelligence support is heavily dependent on all-source, accurate, timely, and relevant intelligence.”

Leaders must also understand the limitations of machines of war and test new technologies under realistic battlefield conditions. Tactical wargaming is indispensable training, according to Vego. An important part of the decision-making matrix is logistics and other forms of command support, including maintenance, defense, and security, among other concerns for any planner or commander. Vego defines and describes various kinds of replenishment.

He presents pros and cons of centralized and decentralized command structures and explains the importance of good communication in C2 and the chain of command. “C2 is not a system or command structure, as often erroneously believed, but the process of planning, preparing, directing, and controlling ones forces in both peacetime and in combat.”

Here again, in senior commanders’ choice of command structures, is the importance of the human factor and finding balance in risk awareness not avoidance.

“Risk avoidance results in over-centralization of C2 and undue interference of the higher commanders in the authority and responsibility of their subordinate commanders. The higher commanders issue overly detailed orders to subordinates to ensure that no mistakes are made. Subordinate commanders quickly realize the dangers of acting on their own initiative. The result is lack of initiative and waiting on orders instead of making quick and independent decisions in the case of a sudden change in the situation.”

Vego presents dozens of examples from history, including surprising ones such as the Battle of the Saintes (1782), Battle of Lissa (1886), and Turko-Greek War (1897).

Crew members aboard USS White Plains (CVE-66) observe Imperial Japanese Navy attack other ships of carrier division 25 in the Battle off Samar, Oct. 25, 1944.

Most of his examples naturally come from the War in the Pacific (1941-1945) and include presentations of strategy, tactics, and operations during the battles of Leyte Gulf, Midway, Savo Island, and Samar, among others, where bold decisions were made by strong leaders.

Good leaders with high intelligence, humility and ethics Vego cites include Adm. Chester Nimitz, Adm. Raymond Spruance, and Royal Navy Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham (1883-1963), pictured at right. They were “trustworthy and trusting” with strong work ethics and wisdom, able to make good and righteous decisions in wartime.

“Decision-making is more art than science. Sound decision-making requires that a naval tactical commander possesses accurate, relevant, and timely information on all aspects of the tactical, and sometimes even some elements of the operational, situation. As time-space relationships continue to compress and the volume of information expands exponentially, making a sound decision will become progressively more difficult. The naval tactical commander’s ability to ‘see’ the battlefield will be greatly improved, but so will the enemy’s ability to frustrate friendly forces’ plans and actions. New information technologies will reduce, perhaps dramatically, uncertainties regarding the location, composition, movements, and these technologies will penetrate the thick veil surrounding the enemies intentions and the unquantifiable elements of the enemy’s situation any better than in the past.”

“Making sound decision requires quick thinking, focus on the essentials, logical reasoning, common sense, and good judgment.” Naval commanders need selfless courage, agility, creativity and foresight as well as the ability to communicate effectively. “Effective communications has an importance far beyond the mere exchange of information. It builds trust, cooperation, and mutual understanding.”

A five-country multinational fleet, during Operation Enduring Freedom in the Oman Sea. In five descending columns, from the top left to the bottom right: MM Maestrale (F 570); FS De Grasse (D 612), USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74); FS Charles De Gaulle (R 91), FS Surcouf (F 711); USS Port Royal (CG-73), HMS Ocean (L 12), USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67), HNLMS Van Amstel (F 831); and MM Durand de la Penne (D 560).

Vego writes, “Any military objective should be balanced (harmonized) with he corresponding factors of space, time, and force.”

Every naval officer can benefit from this book and its advice about balancing multidimensional, multi-domain, nonbinary leadership –– more wisdom than information, more art than science.