“Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia” by Timothy Frye (Princeton University Press, 2021) opens with the exit of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Feb. 21, 2014. The corrupt puppet of Vladimir Putin fled to Russia after being ousted by free and fair elections in Ukraine in which pro-European politicians were subsequently elected.
In Response, Putin invaded Ukraine and occupied Crimea and eastern areas of the country.
It was a big mistake.
Hoping to have more influence and control over his neighbor in 2014, Putin instead strengthened Ukrainian nationalism, European influence, and NATO unity (just has he has –– ten-fold –– since his all-out unprovoked war on the people of Ukraine in 2022).
“The annexation of Crimea brought a four-year surge in support for the Kremlin in Russia, but also removed the largest and most pro-Russian voting bloc –– the roughly 1.5 million Russians in Crimea –– from Ukrainian politics. In past elections, parties openly sympathetic to Moscow regularly received around 40 percent of the vote, but advocating for close relations with Russia is a tougher sell with the Ukrainian electorate after the annexation of Crimea. The landslide victory of the thirty-eight-year-old Volodymyr Zelensky, a Russian speaker from Eastern Ukraine, in the presidential elections in Ukraine in April 2019 suggests that the polarization between eastern and western Ukraine that served Russia so well is less important today than prior to 2014. Moreover, Ukraine’s largest trading partner by far is the European Union ($40 billion per year) rather than Russia ($11 billion), and China is soon to replace Russia as its second-biggest trading partner.
“Moscow’s policies toward Ukraine have bolstered NATO. By the end of 2020, NATO members are expected to have increased spending on defense by $100 billion. NATO has moved roughly four thousand advanced troops to the Baltic states and a smaller number to Poland as a token force to deter Russia. Given the centripetal forces at work in Europe today, weakening of the European Union, and election of a NATO skeptic as US president [Trump], one would have expected NATO to be in grave danger, but it has held up better than anticipated. And that is largely due to Russia’s moves in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and elsewhere.”
Oligarchs like Oleg Deripaska and Viktor Vekselberg reportedly lost billions after the US government sanctioned them in April 2018 for “malign activity around the globe.”
Frye says Putin is, in effect, a candle with a low-burning wick. (Which may explain why he invaded Ukraine again in 2022.)
“Reelected for another six-year term in 2018, Putin has struggled to find a new narrative to lead Russia. With enthusiasm for the Crimean annexation fading and the economy stagnating, his popularity has faltered.”
Speaking of mistakes or consequences of war…
Frye notes, “The best available evidence indicates that Russian-backed rebels in eastern Ukraine shot down a Malaysian commercial airliner by mistake in July 2014, killing almost 300 passengers and crew.” Will a mistake –– or an intentional act made to look like a mistake –– against NATO ignite a larger war in Europe?
Using data and statistics, Frye illuminates that “autocracies have long struggled to elicit honest information from subordinates and monitor implementation of policies.
Frye is a self-described “information warrior” associated with the Levada Center. He is immersed in Russian culture, economics, and statistics.
“Russia has been fertile ground for studying authoritarian rule. Public opinion polls have been far more credible than in other autocracies, and Russia provides more detailed administrative data, including election results, economic information, and social indicators, than do many other authoritarian governments…
“Although less so than in the Soviet period, views of Russia in the West are still highly politicized. Some on the nationalist Right depict Russia as a defender of the traditional family, white race, and Christian faith, but as Anne Applebaum notes, Russian reality if far from these American dreams. Abortion rates in Russia are twice as high as in the United States, few Russians attend church regularly or read the Bible, and a third of Russian families are headed by single mothers with children. And Russia regularly accepts more immigrants than just about any country but the United States.”
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| Pro-Ukraine protest (Pixabay) |
People in Russia would prefer a good home economy than status as a top-five great power. They say they are in favor of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.
And, while historically Russians admire, rather than fear, the brutal imposition of order, Putin’s popularity has been waning in recent years.
“Putin fatigue appears to be setting in; in summer 2020, his presidential approval ratings sagged to their lowest levels since he took office,” Frye notes. The public rewards politicians during a good economy and punishes them in economic downturns.
Perhaps most interesting is this finding: “Despite the broad popularity of the annexation of Crimea, a majority of Russians in 2015 were willing to tell pollsters that they opposed sending Russian troops to Ukraine, and 80 percent of Russians were willing to express opposition to incorporating Ukraine into Russia. The public uses public opinion polls to rail against corruption, inequality, and Russia’s notoriously bad roads as well.”
Although national pride swelled after Crimea was annexed, “the public greatly appreciated that the annexation occurred with little cost in Russian lives.” We continue to see public nationalistic support for Putin now because of Kremlin propaganda and disinformation. But how will the Russian people react when they eventually learn about the cost to their country in blood and treasure?
Frye notes, “The Putin team will cling to power for the same reason that all personalist autocrats do: the fear of what comes next.” He notes, 80 percent of personal autocracies who lost power ended up in jail or exile, or dead…”
The cult-of-personality style of populist authoritarianism seen in Kim’s North Korea, Orban’s Hungary, and Putin’s Russia seems to attract fundamentalist followers who want a return to traditional “values,” “law and order,” less freedom in the media, and more xenophobic nationalism, willing to tell lies to stay in power or achieve political aims.
“Rather than treating Russia’s most recent autocratic turn as rooted in Putin’s KGB past or a return to Russia’s thousand years of dictatorship, we can trace it to a more familiar and recent pattern of modern autocratic rule. As long-standing democracies become increasingly dysfunctional and less attractive as a model, an outsider comes to power in a highly unequal middle-income country. Facing a disorganized opposition, the ruler rides an economic boom to popularity, which he then uses to dismantle courts and legislatures, intimidate the free press, and discredit political opponents as foreign agents. With some nuances for local context, this story would be familiar to observers of Turkey, Venezuela, and Hungary, to name just a few.”
Frye notes, “In 2008, the Bush administration led efforts to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. The stakes were high given Ukraine’s size, complicated history with Moscow, and strategic significance.” Russia ferociously voiced its opposition, and Germany and France criticized the United States position.
“After much internal debate, NATO pledged that Ukraine and Georgia ‘will become NATO members,’ but did not offer a Membership Action Plan with any details or start date.,” Frye writes. “The open-ended commitment was the worst of all worlds.” In 2014 and again in 2022, Putin filled the vacuum with missiles, bombs, and bullets.
Putin’s pretext for annexation of Crimea (and recent invasion) –– feeling threatened by the United States and NATO –– is belied by the facts and statistics Frye presents, in part quoting Professor Stephen Sestanovich: “The number of US troops in Europe in 2014 was one-sixth as large as in 1990, the number aircraft in Europe was down 75 percent, and the United States had removed all of its tank divisions from the continent.”
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| CJCS Gen. Mark Milley testifies April 7, 2022. (Lisa Ferdinando) |
Milley called Russia's invasion of Ukraine "the greatest threat to peace and security of Europe and perhaps the world in my 42 years of service in uniform."
He said Putin's unnecessary war threatens not only European peace and stability, but global peace and stability, noting the war could be protracted over months or even years.
Milley brought up memories of World War II.
"The islands of the Pacific and the beaches of Normandy bore witness to the incredible tragedy that befalls humanity when nations seek power through military aggression across sovereign borders," Milley said. "Despite the horrific assault on the institutions of freedom, it is heartening to see the world rally and say 'never again' to the specter of war in Europe.”
Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany made fatal errors in the 1930s and 40s, ending in the creation of two thriving democracies dedicated to a more peaceful world. Putin’s miscalculations and war crimes have strengthened NATO, united most Americans and Europeans, hardened the resolve of brave Ukrainians, and wreaked havoc on his own country. Big mistake.
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