‘Forging the Trident’ –– TR and Navy Infrastructure

Review by Bill Doughty

Theodore Roosevelt was appointed as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in April 1897, 124 years ago this month. In that position and later as President of the United States, TR helped build the infrastructure of the modern Navy. But, in his attempt to fortify deterrence, did he build inadvertently toward war a generation later?

Editors John B. Hattendorf and William P. Leeman draw up their own blueprint of TR's history with the Navy. They deploy a team of scholars, historians, and essayists to construct an argument for TR’s remarkable role to transform the Navy in “Forging the Trident: Theodore Roosevelt and the United States Navy” (Naval Institute Press, 2020). In complementing essays, various authors show TR’s leadership and influence after the Civil War, through the Spanish-American War and World War I, and –– through his cousin FDR –– in World War II.

TR was born three years before the start of the Civil War. His father was an ardent supporter of the Union, but members of his mother’s family were part of the Confederacy. In fact, his maternal grandparents were slave owners, and his uncles served in the Confederate navy, which is where TR acquired his love of ships and the open ocean.

The authors of “Forging the Trident” show how TR, who came from the party of Abraham Lincoln, negotiated and cajoled to keep the South and North united. Author Sarah Goldberger writes about the politics of reconciliation in “An Indissoluble Union.”

“Upon Roosevelt assuming the presidency, southern Republicans immediately approached him on the importance of taking control of the Republican Party in the South. John Wise, a lawyer from Virginia who now lived in self-appointed exile in New York, brought Roosevelt up to date on the sad state of affairs in Virginia –– that the commonwealth, like the other southern states, would soon disfranchise black voters. Some Republicans –– ‘Lily Whites,’ as they were called –– believed that this was perhaps a good thing, as it would make white men more likely to join the Republican Party; other Republicans saw the elimination of the black voters as fatal to the party. Wise, who considered himself in the latter category, served as the attorney of a group of black plaintiffs who fought disfranchisement. As president, Roosevelt became immersed in the very complex intersection of southern racial politics and federal patronage. Although the majority of federal employment now required civil service examinations, there was still patronage enough to bestow, such as the coveted position of local postmaster.”

TR became determined to change the system of discriminatory and patriarchal patronage into a merit-based system that rewarded performance.

“Roosevelt was determined to appoint only the most qualified people,” Goldberger writes. He invited Booker T. Washington to dinner at the White House to help judge African American appointees, but the backlash from white Southerners was extensive (and would have a lasting effect until the Nixon presidency).

TR delivers a speech on U.S. naval preparedness, Haverhill, MA, 1902.

Following in the footsteps of Lincoln, TR put his faith in the Constitution, the Union, and progressive values. He was also a champion of the environment as a true conservative and conservationist. And he strongly supported the Navy throughout his life.

Under TR’s leadership, the Navy enacted the Personnel Act of 1899. He wanted every Navy officer to be an engineer. He saw the advent of submarines and supported the possibility of developing “flying machines,” including for the Navy. Roosevelt communicated –– like few before him –– the need for public support for the Navy and understanding of its global maritime mission.

In “Checking the Wake While Looking Beyond the Horizon,” David Kohnen observes this about infrastructural changes in the Navy and nation after the Civil War as the country looked beyond its own borders:

“The naval outlook of Roosevelt reflected the confidence associated with industrialization and economic prosperity. Americans viewed the U.S. Navy as a symbol of national unity, as the Reconstruction era culminated in the stunning success of the Spanish-American War. The oceanic borders having been connected with the transcontinental railroad, the armored warships driven by coal-fired steam propelled the U.S. Navy forward in the global maritime arena. The economic rise of the United States remained closely connected to the watery lines of maritime communications –– as the empires of Europe and Asia also competed for economic dominance through naval power.”

Forward-thinking Roosevelt believed in having an international profile. And he strenuously promoted naval innovation.

TR

Under TR, the Navy shifted from coal to oil, deployed wireless communication, and developed new gunnery for its large battleships. “Forging the Trident” explains in several essays how Lt. Cmdr. William S. Sims –– with the support and protection of Roosevelt –– became more influential than most admirals and captains in the era of change in the early 20th century, often in the face of opposition from older traditionalists.

The ghost of Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan haunts this book. In fact, Mahan’s name appears in all but one chapter. TR owed much to Mahan. But, as president, Roosevelt saw that the great geostrategic theorist was also a bureaucratic authoritarian whose “apostasy” stood in TR’s way. So, in order to advance many of the new technologies and strategies of the time, TR gently nudged him into retirement.

Kohnen writes, “As for Mahan, in late 1914 he died, as did the era of coal and multi-caliber battleship guns … The death of Mahan enabled the generation of Sims to pick up the torch in defining the future of American sea power.” 

Volatility extended to the top level of Navy leadership. Historian Branden Little lays out a fascinating review of TR’s turnover of SECNAVs –– six men served as Navy Secretaries during TR’s time as president.

FDR

In another chapter, “Legacy,” Craig Symonds presents an thoughtful look at the similarities as well as the differences between TR and his cousin FDR. “Among their shared values was a belief that government had both the authority and responsibility to proactively improve the lives of American citizens.”

Both men held the same jobs, and both had to be reigned in during their tenures as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. FDR, who married TR’s niece Eleanor, shared “Uncle Ted’s” deep love of the maritime service. He continued TR’s commitment to preparedness of a powerful, modern fleet able to have an impact on the international stage. As presidents, however, FDR proved to be more cerebral and cautious –– and perhaps more effective than TR as a communicator and consensus-builder. FDR, working with allies and former enemies, built a lasting infrastructure of a post-war era of peace for Europe and Asia.

Navy Reads readers may find James R. Holmes’s essay to be the biggest gem in this collection. It appears in chapter 9 and is titled “Why Deterrence Failed: The Imperial Japanese Navy, Strategic Memes, and the Great White Fleet.” 

Using Richard Dawkins’s insights about memes –– published in “The Selfish Gene” –– as a way to explain the history, psychology, and sociology leading to WWII, Holmes examines TR’s strategy to deploy the Great White Fleet as a “Big Stick” intended to show the world the power, prestige, and peacekeeping abilities of the United States.

President Theodore Roosevelt addresses sailors on the after deck aboard USS Connecticut (Battleship #18), in Hampton Roads, Virginia, Feb. 22, 1909. (NHHC)

But was the GWF actually a deterrent? TR may not have fully appreciated the nationalism memes running through Japanese society after the IJN’s victories in the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95, and Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, which “forged the IJN’s access-denial strategy.” TR believed the circumnavigating voyage would foster peace. “The truth is murkier,” Holmes says. In the end, the GWF “message” may have piqued Japan’s pride and hubris –– an incentive for militaristic Japan to build the IJN even stronger, leading to an inevitable clash over Hawaii and the Pacific during FDR’s presidency.

Holmes’s conclusions –– and the legacy of both TR and FDR –– are relevant when thinking about innovative infrastructure initiatives in the United States in 2021.

“Few institutions are are exempt from bureaucratic dynamics –– or stasis. Dynamists typically fare better in armed competition than services set in their ways. Perhaps the way to remain supple and innovative is for top leaders to inscribe one indelible precept on the institutional culture, setting it above all others: No Precept Is Forever. That is one meme worth making permanent. The Imperial Japanese Navy offers an example to avoid –– or to exploit if some future foe appears likewise prone to fixed ideas.”

Reading “Forging the Trident” is like sitting alone with gifted historians and informed communicators telling you about how a great president served as a key architect of the modern Navy at the beginning of the last century. Editors Hattendorf and Leeman have succeeded in designing an indispensable edition –– and addition –– to the Roosevelt bookshelf. No precept is forever, but some concepts can last and improve over time.

OYSTER BAY, New York (Oct. 26, 2018) Cmdr. Julie Schmidt (right), the commanding officer of Navy Operational Support Center Long Island, and Cmdr. Christopher Kendrick, the executive officer of Navy Recruiting District New York, saluting a presidential wreath after placing it beside the grave of President Theodore Roosevelt in Youngs Memorial Cemetery. Students from nearby Theodore Roosevelt Elementary School were on hand to place flowers and play "Taps" to commemorate his birthday. (U.S. Navy photo by Bruce Howard/Released)