Leyte at 75, The World Wonders

Review by Bill Doughty

Was "Bull's Run" Halsey at fault in the Battle of Leyte Gulf? Was MacArthur's massive ego a factor? How did fatigue influence the outcome of the battles? And did fake news possibly prolong the war for Imperial Japan?

These are a few of the ongoing questions explored in Thomas J. Cutler's latest book, "The Battle of Leyte Gulf at 75: A Retrospective" (Naval Institute Press, 2019).

In ten insightful essays along with archival material from the United States Naval Institute, this work adds new reflections on what James D. Hornfischer calls "the greatest upset victory of our Navy and also one of the most embarrassing moments." Hornfischer writes:

"We can find reason to criticize the conduct of most of the high command in this battle, from Admiral Halsey, who failed to communicate clearly with his colleagues as he went north in pursuit of the Japanese carriers, to Admiral Kinkaid, who hung his fate on the unverified assumption that Halsey was watching his back, to Admiral Nimitz who gave Halsey in the first instance excessively flexible operational orders that permitted him to abandon his 'cover and support' mission in favor of offensive action. Underlying all of this was the unfortunate divided command structure that placed the Seventh Fleet under General MacArthur, who required all messages to and from the Third Fleet be relayed through his headquarters at Manus, thousands of miles away, causing critical delays. But the final legacy of the Battle off Samar should be one of appreciation and inspiration, not recrimination."

Nevertheless, Halsey's ghost – and in one chapter his own recounting – hovers throughout this book. Why did Halsey abandon his station and chase after part of the Imperial Japanese fleet? Was he justified but wrong in his judgment? Was he duped?

Halsey's contemporaries and historians in the past 75 years mostly conclude his actions in the battle were a "mistake," an "unfortunate decision," and "overly aggressive."

Kurita

Historians, both American and Japanese, also evaluate the actions of IJN Admiral Takeo Kurita, who appears to have misjudged his enemy and departed the scene prematurely. In this volume of essays, Cutler and other authors examine the effects of fatigue and lack of sleep on Kurita's and even Halsey's actions.

Justifying Kurita's decision to retreat, his chief of staff Rear Adm. Tomiji Koyanagi wrote in USNI's Proceedings in 1953 (included in this book), "A night engagement against our exhausted forces would undoubtedly have been disastrous for us." Koyanagi extolls the fighting acumen of U.S. Navy forces, explains Japanese strategies and tactics, and chalks up some of the outcomes to luck and chance.

In the essay "Halsey's Decision," author Trent Hone notes, "Halsey and his subordinates were tired":

"They had been at sea almost two months. TF 38 began supporting the invasion of the Palaus on 31 August with strikes on the Bonins and Yap. Strikes against the Visayas followed. In mid-September, large-scale attacks on the Philippines convinced Halsey that plans for the invasion of Leyte could be accelerated; they were, but this left little time for rest or to absorb lessons. From 9 to 17 October, TF 38 struck Formosa, the Ryukyus, and targets in the Philippines. The assault on Leyte immediately followed. By the evening of 24 October, Halsey had been 'without sleep for nearly two days.' The Third Fleet had kept the pressure on the Japanese, but the admiral and his men were fatigued with the effort. This made it more likely that they would default to established plans, fall into entrenched habits, and fail to respond creatively to Japanese moves."

Imperial Japan's battleship Musashi under attack during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Along with dry assessments of the planning and conducting of the battle, we get piercing personal recounts by warfighters as well as the cinematic prose of historians Hornfischer (author of "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors") and Cutler. Here's some of Cutler's assessment, republished from Naval History, October 1994, putting the battle in context in his essay "Greatest of All Sea Battles":

"The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the biggest and most multifaceted naval battle in history. It involved hundreds of ships, nearly 200,000 participants, and spanned more than 100,000 square miles. Some of the largest and most powerful ships ever built were sunk, and thousands of men went to the bottom of the sea with them. Every facet of naval warfare – air, surface, subsurface, and amphibious – was involved in this great struggle, and the weapons used included bombs of every type, guns of every caliber, torpedoes, mines, rockets, and even a forerunner of the guided missile.But more than mere size made this battle significant. The cast of characters included such names as Halsey, Nimitz, MacArthur, even Roosevelt. It introduced the largest guns ever used in a naval battle and a new Japanese tactic that would eventually kill more U.S. sailors and sink more U.S. ships than any other used in the war. It was the last clash of the dreadnoughts and the first and only time that gunfire sank a U.S. aircraft carrier. It was replete with awe-inspiring heroism, failed intelligence, sapient tactical planning and execution, flawed strategy, brilliant deception, incredible ironies, great controversies, and a plethora of lessons about strategy, tactics and operations."

Cutler offers a humble introduction to this volume, revealing his personal interest in the battle and acknowledging the flexibility of history as new information and assessments come forth. "No historical topic is ever beyond further insight and interpretation," he writes.

Nimitz presents Halsey with gold star in lieu of a fourth award of the Navy Distinguished Service Medal aboard USS Missouri in Pearl Harbor, Sept. 28, 1945.

Near the end of this collection we see how each side believed they were operating with divine inspiration. In the case of Imperial Japan, commanders operated "with confidence in heavenly guidance" and believed encountering U.S. Navy ships was a "heaven-sent opportunity." Meanwhile, Nimitz said U.S. ships were saved by "nothing short of special dispensation from the Lord Almighty." Assured of having God on their side, Imperial Japan had begun sending kamikaze ("divine wind") pilots on suicide missions.

In his essay from the Proceedings archives (March 1951) "Leyte Gulf: The First Uncensored Japanese Account" we read James A. Field Jr.'s Orwellian aspect of the war as reported in Japan:

"Following the arrival of American occupation forces in Japan, restrictions on accurate reporting of the course of the war were removed. It was obviously important to set the record straight and to explain to the Japanese public how such an unsurpassed series of victories had led to such utter defeat. It was important not alone for academic reasons of historical accuracy, but also as a vital step in the re-education of the Japanese, and as an object lesson in what happens when a people permits totalitarian control of all sources of information."

Aboard USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55). (MCSN Zachary Pearson.)

The lessons of the Battle of Leyte Gulf carry to our century despite the evolution of sea control, air power and naval warfare.

As Hornfischer concludes in is essay "The Tin Can Sailors are Gone: What Naval History Loses with the Passing of the World War II Generation," "A nation rises to the level of the stories it tells about itself."

The well-respected and passionate Thomas J. Cutler has put together a compelling collection of then-and-now stories, assessments and analyses. This Naval Institute Press book is another highly recommended edition for anyone interested in World War II and especially the Pacific War.

This month and for much of this year, USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55) is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet areas of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points. Sailors of USS Leyte Gulf are underway as part of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (ABECSG) deployment in support of maritime security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th, 6th and 7th Fleet areas of responsibility. With Abraham Lincoln as the flagship, deployed strike group assets include staffs, ships and aircraft of Carrier Strike Group 12 (CSG 12), Destroyer Squadron 2 (DESRON 2), USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55) and Carrier Air Wing 7 (CVW 7); as well as Alvaro de Bazan-class frigate ESPS Méndez Núñez (F 104).